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Abstract
This article suggests that the trend of accepting the supremacy and direct application of in-
ternational law represents a rethinking of the relationship between international and national law,
and that its full implications are yet to be explored. The Article seeks to build on current writ-
ings on the subject by analyzing certain regional arrangements and judicial approaches relevant
to, but often ignored in the discussion. It attempts not to situate these arrangements or approaches
within or outside of the monist/dualist paradigm, but to assess the practical significance of these
arrangements for international law, national law, and their respective subjects.
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INTRODUCTION
Africa is becoming more "international law-friendly";1 the
initial hostility or ambivalence of the post-colonial towards inter-
national law2 is giving way to increased participation in interna-
tional law processes, both in terms of institutional participation
and in the development of norms.3 Indeed, it has been sug-
gested that an "African international law" has emerged.4 More
remarkable for our present purpose, and arguably a characteris-
tic of this new African international law, is a trend in Africa to-
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ing of this Article.
1. See Tiyanjana Maluwa, The Incorporation of International Law and Its Interpretational
Role in Municipal Legal Systems in Africa: An Exploratory Survey, 23 S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 45,
46 (1998) (citing Gerhard Erasmus, The Namibian Constitution and the Application of Inter-
national Law, 15 S. AR. Y.B. INT'L L. 81, 93 (1989-1990)).
2. See Georges M. Abi-Saab, The Newly Independent States and the Rules of International
Law: An Outline, 8 How. LJ. 95, 118-19 (1962); R.P. Anand, Attitude of the Asian-African
States Toward Certain Problems of International Law, 15 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 55, 70 (1966);
Abdillahi Said Osman, The Attitude of Newly Independent States Towards International Law:
The Need for Progressive Development, 48 NoRDIc J. INT'L L. 15, 15-24 (1979).
3. See generally TIYANJANA MALUJWA, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN POST-COLONIAL AFRICA
(1999); Tiyanjana Maluwa, International Law-Making in the Organisation of African Unity:
An Overview, 12 AR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 201 (2000) [hereinafter Maluwa, International
Law-Making]; Tiyanjana Maluwa, International Law-Making in Post-Colonial Africa: The
Role of the Organization of African Unity, 49 NETH. INT'L. L. Rsv. 81 (2002) [hereinafter
Maluwa, Post-Colonial]; Tiyanjana Maluwa, The OAU/African Union and International Law:
Mapping New Boundaries or Revising Old Terrain?, 98 AM. Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 232 (2004)
[hereinafter Maluwa, The OAU/African Union and International Law]. But see A. Peter
Mutharika, The Role of International Law in the Twenty-First Century: An African Perspective,
18 FORnHAM INT'L L.J. 1706, 1719 (1995) (noting that Africa has generally been a recip-
ient of rather than a contributor to the development of international law).
4. See P.F. Gonidec, Towards a "Treatise of African International Law", 9 AR. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 807, 807 (1997).
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wards making international law supreme over and directly or au-
tomatically applicable within the domestic legal system.5 While
in theory this trend may not be radical in civil law countries, it is
for common law countries, both from a theoretical and practical
perspective. Common law countries, unlike their monist civilian
counterparts, often adopt a dualist approach to the relationship
between international law and national law, especially regarding
treaties.6 The trend of accepting the supremacy and direct ap-
plication of international law has been complemented by judi-
cial reliance on unincorporated treaties and decisions of interna-
tional tribunals in adjudication. This Article suggests that this
trend represents a rethinking of the relationship between inter-
national and national law, and that its full implications are yet to
be explored.
Traditionally, scholars posit two approaches to the recep-
tion of international law into the national legal system, charac-
terizing countries as "monist" or "dualist."'8 Monists view interna-
tional and national law as part of a single legal order. Under this
approach, international law is directly applicable in the national
legal order. There is no need for any domestic implementing
legislation; international law is immediately applicable within na-
tional legal systems.9 Indeed, to monists, international law is su-
perior to national law. 10 The dualists, on the other hand, view
international and national law as distinct legal orders. For inter-
national law to be applicable in the national legal order, it must
be received through domestic legislative measures, the effect of
5. See MALUWA, supra note 3, at 48-51.
6. See Maluwa, supra note 1, at 51.
7. See id. at 61-63.
8. See Felice Morgenstern, Judicial Practice and the Supremacy of International Law, 27
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 42, 91 (1950);J.G. Starke, Monism and Dualism in the Theory oflnterna-
tional Law, 17 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 66, 67 (1936). See generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 31-33 (6th ed. 2003); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL
LAw 121-24 (5th ed. 2003).
9. See, e.g., Matt Schaefer, Are Private Remedies in Domestic Courts Essential for Interna-
tional Trade Agreements to Perform Constitutional Functions with Respect to Sub-Federal Govern-
ments?, 17 NW.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 609, 628 (1997).
10. Not all monists adhere to such a conception of the relationship between na-
tional and international law. For example, although Hans Kelsen was an advocate of
monism, he did not argue that international law was superior to national law. In his
view, international law may be subjected to particular norms within the national legal
system. In other words, to him, monism required that legal norms be part of a single
system of law, but left open the question of the relationship between the norms. See
HANS KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW 328-47 (Max Knight trans., 1967).
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which is to transform the international rule into a national one.
It is only after such a transformation that individuals within the
State may benefit from or rely on the international (now na-
tional) law.1 To the dualist, international law cannot claim
supremacy within the domestic legal system although it is su-
preme in the international law legal system.12
While the monist/dualist debate continues to shape aca-
demic discourse and judicial decisions, it is unsatisfactory in
many respects. The debate focuses on the source or pedigree
of norms and ignores the substance of the norms at issue. By
creating a dichotomy between norms on the basis of their
sources, we risk being blinded from assessing the merits of the
contents of the norms at issue. International and national law
have traditionally addressed relatively different issues, the for-
mer concentrating on the relationships among States, and the
latter on relationships among persons within its jurisdiction. 14
In recent times, however, there is gradual convergence of inter-
est, and the ultimate goal of both systems is to secure the wellbe-
ing of individuals.15 This common goal manifests itself in
human rights law, environmental law, and commercial law, areas
where there is increasing interaction between the national and
international. 6 Thus, international and national law have a lot
in common, and an attempt to compartmentalize or isolate
them will be analytically flawed and practically inapposite at pre-
sent.
The theoretical problems with the monist/dualist paradigm
aside, the relationship between international law and national
law has important practical implications for both systems and
their subjects. It determines the extent to which individuals can
rely on international law for the vindication of their rights within
the national legal system, and has implications for the effective-
ness of international law, which generally lacks effective enforce-
11. See, e.g., Morgenstern, supra note 8, at 50; SHAW, supra note 8, at 129.
12. A classic illustration of this rule is the rule that a State cannot rely on its domes-
tic rules to negate its international obligation.
13. See, e.g., BROWNUE, supra note 8, at 53; D.W. GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAw 44-45
(1970).
14. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 32; MARTIN DIXON, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 80 (5th ed. 2005).
15. See SHAw, supra note 8, at 44-47.
16. See id.
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ment mechanisms.17 As Professor Malcolm Shaw has noted "it is
precisely because of the inadequate enforcement facilities that
lie at the disposal of international law that one must consider the
relationship with municipal law as of more than marginal impor-
tance." 8 The relationship between the two systems may also de-
termine the extent to which there is cross-fertilization of norms
generated in both systems. The extent to which international
law can compel or induce reform in national law hinges on this
relationship. The respect accorded a legal system is enhanced
when it is able to influence normative developments in other
legal systems.' 9
Current writings on the subject in Africa have generally con-
centrated on national/constitutional provisions and judicial
treatment of customary international law.2" Ordinarily, these
writings have not gone beyond trying to demonstrate whether
the practice in the relevant countries on the continent conforms
to or departs from the monist/dualist paradigm.2 This Article
seeks to build on these previous works by analyzing certain re-
gional arrangements and judicial approaches relevant to but
often ignored in the discussion. It attempts not to situate these
arrangements or approaches within or outside of the monist/
dualist paradigm, but to assess the practical significance of these
arrangements for international law, national law, and their re-
spective subjects.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NATIONAL LAW- REGIONAL
ECONOMIC ARRANGEMENTS, JUDICIAL DECISIONS,
AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
From the perspective of the relationship between interna-
tional and national law, significant developments are taking
17. See Andre Stemmet, The Influence of Recent Constitutional Developments in South
Africa on the Relationship Between International Law and Municipal Law, 33 INr'L LAw. 47,
47 (1999).
18. SHAW, supra note 8, at 161.
19. See Lucy Reed, Great Expectations: Where Does the Proliferation of International Dis-
pute Resolution Tribunals Leave International Law?, 96 Am. Soc'y INT'L L. PROC. 219, 231
(2002).
20. See, e.g., MALUWA, supra note 3, at 31-51; P.F. Gonidec, The Relationship ofInter-
national Law and National Law in Africa, 10 AFR, J. INT'L & COMP. L. 244 (1998); Maluwa,
supra note 1; Stemmet, supra note 17.
21. See, e.g., MALUWA, supra note 3, at 31-51; Gonidec, supra note 20; Maluwa,
supra note 1; Stemmet, supra note 17.
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place within some regional economic arrangements and na-
tional legal systems in Africa. Some African countries have ac-
cepted the direct and automatic application of international law
within their national legal systems. Others have subjected their
national legal systems to an international one in defined areas.2 2
International law is also finding a place, hitherto unavailable, in
domestic adjudication and national constitutions. 23 These devel-
opments have been propelled by economic, social, and political
considerations. National legal systems have been responding to
legal developments in other national legal systems and in inter-
national law.2 4 There is growing evidence of vertical and hori-
zontal interaction between and among these legal systems. 25
Ironically, all these developments have largely gone unnoticed
in the academic world. This Section examines these develop-
ments, exposes their innovative aspects, and assesses their signifi-
cance for Africa and the legal subjects affected.
A. The East African Community
The East African Community Treaty ("EAC Treaty") ,26
which entered into force in 2001, establishes a community con-
sisting of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. The objective of the
Community is to develop policies and programs aimed at widen-
ing and deepening co-operation among the Member States in
the political, economic, social, and legal fields, among others. 2 7
The EAC Treaty envisages a customs union, a common market,
and ultimately, a political federation of the States involved. 28
The achievement of these goals demands the transfer or surren-
der of some level of sovereignty to the community and its institu-
tions. 29 Strong institutions are a prerequisite for successful inte-
22. See, e.g., discussion infra Part I(E).
23. See discussion infra Parts I (D-E).
24. See discussion infra Part II.
25. See discussion infra Part II.
26. See The East African Community Treaty, Nov. 30, 1999, [hereinafter EAC
Treaty], http://www.eac.int/documents/EAC%20Treaty.pdf (last visited Nov. 20,
2006). See generally Susan Fitzke, The Treaty for East African Co-Operation: Can East Africa
Successfully Revive One of Africa's Most Infamous Economic Groupings?, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 127 (1999); Wilbert Kaahwa, The Treaty Establishing the New East African Commu-
nity: An Overview, 7 AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 61 (1999).
27. See EAC Treaty, supra note 26, art. 5(1).
28. See id. art. 5(2).
29. Perhaps no concept defies definition more than sovereignty. In this Article the
term "transfer of sovereignty" is used to refer to the transfer to international organiza-
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gration. Indeed, the absence of strong independent institutions
to counter-balance political inertia to integration is a major rea-
son for the slow pace of economic integration in Africa notwith-
standing multiple initiatives towards economic integration.3 ° Ac-
cordingly, the EAC Treaty grants sovereignty to Community in-
stitutions and organs and elevates Community law above
national laws.3' Article 8(4) of the Treaty provides, "Community
organs, institutions and laws shall take precedence over similar
national ones on matters pertaining to the implementation of
this Treaty."32 The Treaty also establishes the East African Court
of Justice. 3 The decisions of the Court "have precedence over
decisions of national court on a similar matter."34 The impor-
tance of these provisions partly lies in their recognition of the
importance of the strong institutions for the success of economic
integration and the willingness to provide for that.
Article 8(4) appears to be a reaction against two previous
Kenyan judicial decisions, which rejected the subordination of
national law to Community law.35 In the case of Okunda v. Re-
public,36 the question of the supremacy of East African Commu-
nity ("EAC") law over Kenyan law was in issue. Two persons were
being prosecuted under the Official Secrets Act 1968 of the EAC
without the consent of the counsel for the community. Under
Section 8(1) of the Act, such consent was necessary. The ques-
tion was whether the Attorney General of Kenya could institute
that proceeding without such consent.3 Resolving this issue in-
tions of the power to make decisions with significant national impact and the ability of
laws not generated within the State to directly affect rights and obligations within a
nation's legal system. For a recent discussion of the concept, see generally John H.
Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept, 97 AM.J. INT'L L. 782
(2003); Jenik Radon, Balance of Power: Redefining Sovereignty in Contemporary International
Law, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 195 (2004);
30. See NsonguruaJ. Udombana, A Harmony or a Cacophony? The Music of Integration
in the African Union Treaty and the New Partnership for Africa's Development, 13 IND. INT'L &
COMp. L. REV. 185, 202-06 (2002).
31. See EAC Treaty, supra note 26, arts. 8(4)-(5).
32. Id. art. 8(4). In pursuance of this provision, Article 8(5) enjoins Member
States to make the necessary legal instruments to confer precedence of Community
institutions and laws over similar national ones. See id. art. 8(5).
33. See id. art. 9(1)(e).
34. See id. art. 33(2).
35. See id. art. 8(4).
36. See Okunda v. Republic, 9 I.L.M. 556 (1970) (Kenya).
37. See id. at 556.
38. See id.
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volved examining the relationship between the community law
and Section 26(8) of the Kenyan Constitution, which provided
that, in the performance of his duty, the Attorney General shall
not be subject to the "direction or control of any person. 39
Counsel for the Community submitted that the conflict between
the two provisions should be resolved in favor of Community
law. He argued that, under the Treaty for East African Co-opera-
tion,4 ° the members undertook to take all steps within their
power to pass legislation to give effect to the Treaty, and to con-
fer upon Acts of the Community the force of law within their
territory. 4' Further, under Article 4 of the Treaty, the members
were enjoined "to make every effort to plan and direct their poli-
cies with a view to creating favourable conditions for the devel-
opment of the Common Market and the achievement of the
aims of the Community." In the view of counsel, by these provi-
sions, Member States agreed to "surrender part of their sover-
eignty."42
The Court found that nothing had been done by Kenya in
breach of these obligations, and that the laws of the Community
are, under the Kenyan Constitution, part of the laws of Kenya;
and, in the event of conflict, are void to the extent of their in-
consistency with the Constitution, the Constitution being the su-
preme law of the land.43 Although an appeal from this decision
was subsequently dismissed by the Court of Appeal for East Af-
39. CONSTITUTION, art. 26(8) (1992) (Kenya).
40. See Treaty for East African Co-operation, June 6, 1967, 6 I.L.M 932 (1967).
This Treaty is the direct predecessor of the EAC Treaty. See generally Fitzke, supra note
26; Neil Orloff, Economic Integration in East Africa: The Treaty for East-Afican Co-Operation,
7 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. (1968).
41. See Okunda, 9 I.L.M. at 557.
42. For comparative purposes, it is revealing how these arguments of counsel
mimic, without making reference to, similar teleological and textual arguments used by
the European Court of Justice to assert the supremacy of European Community law
over the national laws of Member States. See Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., Case 6/64,
[1964] E.C.R. 585, 588-98. Subsequently, in Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v.
Simmenthal, it was held that not even a fundamental rule of national constitutional law
can be invoked to challenge a directly applicable Community law. Case 106/77, [1978]
E.C.R. 629, 29. In an article in the East African Law Journal some few years before the
Okunda decision, the author made reference to the Flaminio Costa decision, but failed to
discuss its implications, at least for comparative purposes, for the law of the East African
Community. See F.X. Njenga, Contrast between the Effect of Laws of E.E. C. and E.A. C., 4 E.
AFR. L.J. 138, 151 (1968).
43. See Okunda, 9 I.L.M. at 558.
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rica," the Court, recognizing that the case raised an issue of
"fundamental importance," held obiter that "the Constitution of
Kenya is paramount and any law, whether it be of Kenya, of the
Community or any other country which has been applied in Ke-
nya, which is in conflict with the Constitution is void to the ex-
tent of the conflict."45 In a previous case that also involved a
conflict between community and Kenyan law, the Court had af-
firmed the superiority of Kenyan law.46
Article 8(4) demonstrates a resolve on the part of these
common law countries, inspired by the potential economic ben-
efits of successful integration, and possibly by similar jurispru-
dence in European community law, to subject their national le-
gal order to the international legal order-in this case, Commu-
nity law. This is a move that is unparalleled as far as the legal
frameworks for other regional economic communities and for
common law Africa are concerned.4 7 Although at common law,
an incorporated treaty provision may take precedence over an
44. See Okunda, 9 I.L.M. at 561 (1970).
45. Id. at 555-56.
46. See In the Matter of an Application by Evan Maina (Miscell) Case no. 7/1969
cited in YASH P. GHAI, REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN EAST AFRIcA
34-35 (1976). This case arose under the East African Customs and Transfer Manage-
ment Act, a Community legislation, which defines, inter alia, a number of offenses.
Section 174 provides that if the Commissioner of Customs is satisfied that any person
has committed an offence against the Act in respect of which a fine is provided, he may
compound such offence and summarily order him to pay a sum not exceeding 200
shillings. The Court held that Section 174 was inconsistent with Section 77(1) of the
Kenyan Constitution, which says: "If any person is charged with a criminal offence,
then, unless the charge is withdrawn the case shall be afforded a fair hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial court established by law." The Court
rejected the contention for the Customs' authorities that the offense under considera-
tion was a "customs" rather than a "criminal" offense, and therefore Section 77 of the
Constitution had no bearing on the case. Other sub-sections of 77 require the trial to
proceed only in the presence of the accused, unless he himself agrees otherwise, or his
conduct makes it difficult; has been provided with an opportunity to defend himself in
person or by a legal representative of his choice. Both these provisions were contra-
vened, nor was the Commissioner a "court" within the meaning of the Section. There
was therefore a clear clash between Section 174 and the Constitution. The Court then
turned to the significance of the clash. Could the Community law be upheld despite
the clash? The Court held that it could not, for the Constitution provides that "if any
law is inconsistent with this Constitution, this Constitution shall prevail and the other
law, shall to the extent of inconsistency be void."
47. See generally Yuval Shany, How Supreme is the Supreme Law of the Land? Compara-
tive Analysis of the Influence of International Human Rights Treaties Upon the Interpretation of
Constitutional Texts by Domestic Courts, 31 BROOK. J. lar'L L. 341 (2006) (comparing dif-
ferent nations and their stances on incorporation of international laws into municipal
laws).
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inconsistent national law, this is only with respect to a prior na-
tional law.4 8 It cannot claim supremacy over a subsequent incon-
sistent national law. Under Article 8(4) of the EAC Treaty, Com-
munity law is supreme whether it pre-dates or post-dates a con-
trary domestic law.49 This provision ties the hands of Member
State governments, for they cannot legislate, even in the future,
a law contrary to Community law.5" It implies a restriction on
national decision-making powers.
It is difficult to anticipate how national courts will react if a
similar conflict arises between Community law and national law
given the new supremacy provision. Even more difficult is the
question of what happens in the event of a clash between Com-
munity law and national constitutional law.5 For example, in
Kenya, although Article 3 of the Proposed Constitution of 200552
listed the law of the EAC as part of the laws of Kenya, it expressly
provided that Community law was only law in Kenya "to the ex-
tent that it is consistent with this Constitution. ' 53 Article 2 not
only proclaimed the supremacy of the Kenyan Constitution, but
also provided that the validity or legality of the Constitution can-
not be subject to challenge by or before any court or State or-
gan.54 Arguably, this would have prevented national courts from
declaring a provision of the Constitution invalid vis-a-vis Commu-
nity law, but would not have prevented the Court of Justice of
the EAC from doing so.55  In Tanzania, the legislation imple-
48. SeeJohn H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis,
86 Am. J. INT'L. L. 310, 330-37(1992).
49. See EAC Treaty, supra note 26, art. 8(4).
50. For some policy arguments for and against the supremacy of international law
within national legal systems, see Jackson, supra note 48.
51. A clash between Community law and national constitutions is likely to be rare,
but it is by no means impossible, as the experience of the European Union ("EU")
demonstrates. See, e.g., Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal, Case
106/77, [1978] E.C.R. 629; Regina v. Sec'y of State for Transp., [1991] 1 A.C. 603
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
52. See PROPOSED NEW CONSTITUTION OF KENYA (2005), KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLE-
MENIT No. 63, art. 3. This Constitution was rejected in a referendum held on November
21, 2005 for reasons mainly related to its provisions on presidential powers. See Marc
Lacey, Kenya Voters Rebuff Leader on Revamping Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2005, at
A12.
53. Id. art. 3.
54. See id. art. 2(1-2).
55. See id. art. 2(4-5).
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menting the EAC Treaty56 does not purport to impose any such
restriction. It gives the Treaty "the force of law" within Tanzania
and annexes the Treaty to the Act without amending the
Supremacy Clause. An Act of the Community comes into force
on the date of its publication in the official Gazette and does not
need any implementing legislation, 8 evidencing the direct effect
of Community law. Whether this Supremacy Clause will prompt
courts to hold that "[e]ven the most minor piece of technical
Community legislation ranks above the most cherished national
constitution norm"59 remains to be seen. What is certain is that
the judiciary is aware of the existence and implications of this
supremacy provision."
This initiative by the EAC represents a great leap by the
States concerned towards collective exercise of sovereignty
through an international institution.6' It reveals an approach to
regional economic governance worth emulating on the conti-
nent.6 2 Economic integration in Africa will be strengthened
under the governance of strong institutions at the community
level. The EAC initiative also represents a significant advance in
the status of international law.6" Even within the European
Union ("EU"), where the principles of supremacy of community
law and direct effect are accepted doctrines, they still have "the
status of unwritten principles of law."6 4 They neither have a
56. See Treaty for the Establishment of East African Community Act, No. 4 of 2001
(Tanz.), http://www.kituochakatiba.co.ug/tzeac.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2006).
57. See id. § 8(1).
58. See id. § 8(2).
59. STEPHEN WEATHERILL, LAW AND INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 106
(1995).
60. See Shah v. Manurama Ltd, (2002) 1 E.A.L.R. 294, 297-98 (Uganda) (citing the
supremacy provision as one reason why a resident of the Community need no longer
pay security for cost when litigating before national courts). For discussion of the facts
and the relevant parts of the judgement in this case, see infra notes 226-232.
61. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic
Law, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 841, 856 (2003).
62. See generally id.
63. See Maurice Oduor, Resolving Trade Disputes in Africa: Choosing Between Multi-
lateralism and Regionalism: The Case of COMISA and the WTO, 13 TUL.J. INT'L & COMP. L.
177, 184 (2005).
64. Bruno De White, Direct Effect, Supremacy, and the Nature of the Legal Order, in THE
EVOLUTION OF EU LAw 194 (Paul Craig & Grainne de Burca eds., 1999). Article 10(1)
of the Draft EU Constitutional Treaty provided that "[t]he Constitution, and law
adopted by the Union's Institutions in exercising competences conferred on it, shall
have primacy over the law of the Member States." See generally Per Cramer, Does the
2007]
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place in the EEC Treaty or its revisions, nor are they reflected in
the national constitutions of EU Member States. They are, how-
ever, undoubtedly part of accepted law within the EU.65
B. The Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law
in Africa
The objective of the Treaty establishing the Organisation
for the Harmonisation of Business Laws in Africa ("OHADA") 66
is to harmonize the business laws in the contracting States.6 7
This is to be done through the elaboration and adoption of sim-
ple modern common rules adapted to their economies. 68 Cur-
rently, OHADA has a membership of sixteen States.69 Most of
them are francophone States, the majority in the West African
sub-region. y The underdeveloped state of the commercial law
regime in Africa is arguably a reflection and product of the low
level of commercial activity. Consequently, the willingness of
these African governments to abandon their disparate national
laws and adopt a unified one is a triumph for international law
and cooperation on the continent.7' Unification of law ensures
certainty. People transacting across national boundaries will be
subject to the same substantive law, thus ensuring equality of le-
gal treatment and a potential reduction in transaction costs.
The OHADA presents an opportunity for social integration in
the region. That is to say, if law is the cement of society, people
Codification of the Principle of Supremacy Matter, 7 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. OF EUR. LEGAL STUD. 57
(2004-2005).
65. See id. at 193-98.
66. Treaty on the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa, Oct. 17, 1993, [herein-
after OHADA Treaty) http://www.ohada.com/traite.php (last visited Nov. 20, 2006).
There is a dearth of English writings on this organization, but see generally BORIS
MARTOR ET AL., BUSINESS LAW IN AFRICA: OHADA AND THE HARMONIZATION PROCESS
(2002); Claire Moore Dickerson, Harmonising Business Laws in Africa: OHADA Case Calls
the Tune, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 17 (2005); Xavier Forneris, Harmonising Commer-
cial Law in Africa: The OHADA, JuRIs PERIODIQUE 6 (July-Sept. 2001).
67. See OHADA Treaty, supra note 66, art. 1.
68. Id.
69. They are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the
Comoros, Congo-Brazzaville, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Equatorial
Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Chad, and Togo. See Organization for the Harmonisation
of Business Law in Africa, Member States of the OHADA, http://www.ohada.com/
etat-partie.php (last visited Nov. 10, 2006).
70. See MARTOR ET AL., supra note 66, at 5.
71. See id. at 1-2.
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living under a unified system of law will feel more connected
with one another.
An examination of the Treaty provides more evidence of
the preparedness of African governments to re-think the rela-
tionship between international and national law by relinquishing
a measure of sovereignty to promote economic development.
Under the Treaty, Member States have ceded some level of na-
tional sovereignty in order to establish a single cross-border re-
gime of uniform business laws called "Uniform Acts."7 2 As one
writer has perceptively observed, "no one can deny that transfer
of sovereignty occurs under OHADA." 3 Although it may be too
early to assess the success of the OHADA initiative, the very exis-
tence of the initiative and the number of Uniform Acts so far
agreed upon are impressive. Among those currently adopted
are Uniform Acts on General Commercial Law, Commercial
Companies and Economic Interest Groups, Secured Transac-
tions, Bankruptcy, Debt Collection Procedures, and Accounting
Law.74
The Uniform Acts "are directly applicable and overriding in
the Contracting States notwithstanding any conflict they may
give rise to in respect of previous or subsequent enactment of
municipal laws."'75 These laws are automatically and immediately
applicable within the national legal systems of each country. No
national implementing legislation is necessary. The Common
Court of Justice and Arbitration ("Common Court") established
under the Treaty76 has held that the Uniform Acts also abrogate
contrary national laws. 77 The Common Court is the final author-
72. See id. at 18-19.
73. See Forneris, supra note 66, at 6.
74. See MARTOR ET AL., supra note 66, at 18.
75. OHADA Treaty, supra note 66, art. 10.
76. This Court is established by Article 3 of the OHADA Treaty as one of the two
principal institutions of the organization, the other being the Council of Ministers. See
OHADA Treaty, supra note 66, art. 3. The court hears appeals on the application of the
Uniform Acts. See id. art. 14. These appeals may be brought on referral from national
court or directly by individuals. See id. art. 15.
77. See MAMADOU KONE, LE NouvEAu DROIT COMMERCIAL DES PAYS DE LA ZONE
OHADA: COMPARISONS AvEc LE DROIT FRANCAIS 5 (2003). Mamadou Kone notes that:
The legal unification rests upon the Uniform Acts. Article 5 of the Treaty
defines the Uniform Act as one that is used to adopt common laws. Article 10
of the same treaty specifies the juridical (legal) value of these Acts. It provides
that they are "directly applicable and mandatory in the Contracting States de-
spite all contrary rules of previous or subsequent internal law." The text high-
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ity on the interpretation and enforcement of the Treaty, the
adopted Regulations, and the Uniform Acts.7 8 Parties to the
OHADA Treaty or the Council of Ministers may seek advisory
opinions from the Common Court.7" The Common Court may
also hear appeals on referral from national courts or directly by
aggrieved individuals. 8' The decisions of the Court are final,
conclusive, and override those of all national courts including
national supreme courts."1 This allows for the uniform interpre-
tation and application of the Uniform Acts.
From the perspective of the constitutional arrangements in
the OHADA Member States, the doctrines of direct applicability
and supremacy of international law over domestic law may not
be a radical departure from existing constitutional law. The ma-
jority of its members, who are former French colonies, have con-
stitutional provisions modeled after Article 55 of the French
Constitution of 1958, which provides that "treaties or agree-
ments duly ratified or approved shall, upon their publication,
have an authority superior to that of domestic legislation, sub-
ject, for each agreement or treaty, to application by the other
party."8 2 Although Article 55 makes treaties superior to domes-
lights two things. First, the Uniform Acts apply directly to the internal juridi-
cal order of the states. Contracting States do not need to take a legislative act
to insure the application of the Uniform Acts in internal juridical order. As
soon as they are adopted and published, the Uniform Acts apply directly and
equally to all Contracting States. Second, the Uniform Acts have an "above-
legal" value. In this sense, in case of conflict between a Uniform Act and a
national law, the former takes precedence. Consequently, a rule of a Uniform
Act leads to the repeal of contrary national law. The C.C.J.A [Common
Court] maintained this point in an Advisory Opinion of April 30, 2001, to the
request of the Republic of Ivory Coast. In the Advisory Opinion, the judges
affirmed that Article 10 of the treaty incorporates a policy of supranationality;
that the article abrogates national laws, contrary or identical to those of the
Uniform Acts, and precludes the Contracting States from legislating contrary
to the Uniform Acts. The C.C.J.A reinforced the same position when it invali-
dated the application of articles 180 and 181 of the Ivorian Code of Civil Pro-
cedure because they are contrary to article 32 of the Uniform Act on Simpli-
fied Recovery Procedures and Enforcement Measures.
Id. (Author's translation). Thanks to Faisal Lintuuran of the University of British Co-
lumbia for helping me with this translation. See also MARTOR ET AL., supra note 66, at
20-22.
78. See OHADA Treaty, supra note 66, arts. 14, 20.
79. See id. art. 14.
80. See id. arts. 14-15.
81. See id. art. 20.
82. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF BURKINA FASO, art. 151 (1991); CONSTITUTION OF THE
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tic legislation, there are conditions that must be satisfied for this
to happen. 3 First, the agreement has to be duly ratified or ap-
proved and published. Due ratification entails ensuring legisla-
tive, and sometimes judicial, intervention or participation before
the treaty is ratified.84 This contrasts with the approach in com-
mon law jurisdictions, where the executive negotiates and con-
cludes treaties that must subsequently be approved by the legisla-
ture.85 The second requirement is that of reciprocity in the ap-
plication of the treaty.8 6 It is as regards this second requirement
that the implementation of the Uniform Acts in Member States'
legal systems departs from the constitutional model. The appli-
cation of the Acts within the national legal systems of the Mem-
ber States is not founded on reciprocity.87
The OHADA project represents a laudable effort at re-
forming the commercial laws of the States engaged. Indeed, it is
a project that should be encouraged to potentially cover the
whole of Africa.88 From the perspective of international law, the
real test for OHADA will come when common law countries,
with their traditional adherence to dualism, begin to join. Cur-
rently, countries such as Nigeria and Ghana are contemplating
membership.89 Arguably, the supremacy and direct application
clause may be one of the reasons why there is currently no com-
mon law member of OHADA.90 It will demand a reworking of
REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON, art. 45 (1996); CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MALI, art.
116 (1992).
83. See, e.g., Vincent Kronenberger, A New Approach to the Interpretation of the French
Constitution in Respect of International Conventions: From Hierarchy of Norms to Conflict of
Competence, 47 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 323 (2000).
84. See id. at 329.
85. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA, art. 75 (1992); CONSTITU-
TION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 1996, art. 231.
86. For a critique of this reciprocity requirement, see Antonio Cassese, Modern Con-
stitutions and International Law, 192(3) REcUEIL DES CouRs 341, 405-08 (1985).
87. See MARTOR ET AL., supra note 66, at 6, 26.
88. Differences in national law pose great problems for economic development.
Thus, countries are increasingly discussing the need to iron out differences in national
laws. For example, in Europe there is discussion on the need for a uniform private law
for Europe. Although this may be far from realization, the existence of the discussion is
instructive. See generally JANS SMITS, THE MAKING OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW (Nicole
Kornet trans., 2002).
89. See Dickerson, supra note 66, at 67 n.202.
90. Other reasons include the civil law character of the Uniform Acts and the lack
of awareness about the work of OHADA. There are efforts to create awareness about
the work of OHADA in common law countries. For example, in 2003 and 2004 two
conferences for that purpose were held in Ghana and Nigeria, respectively. An
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existing constitutional provisions on the effect of treaties in na-
tional law before these common law countries can effectively
participate in the work of OHADA.9"
C. The African Economic Community
The Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community
("AEC Treaty") is further evidence of the preparedness of Afri-
can governments to re-examine the relationship that exists be-
tween international and national law. The Treaty envisages an
economic community covering the whole of Africa, which will be
achieved through defined stages including the establishment of
a free market, a customs union, and a common market.12 All of
these entail the surrender of some level of sovereignty to the
Community. Under Article 3(e) of the AEC Treaty, Member
States must observe the legal system of the Community.93 This
provision suggests that the AEC has been constituted as a legal
system distinct from those of the Member States. As positivists
have demonstrated, an essential characteristic of a legal system is
the presence of an ultimate authority whose norms directly bind
the subjects of the system and cannot be contradicted or subor-
dinated either by them or by any other external source. 9 4 Argua-
bly, by constituting the AEC as a legal system, the Member States
have conferred this characteristic on it. The effect of this char-
OHADA Resource Center has also been established in Ghana. See Samuel Kofi Date-
Bah, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the Harmonization
of the Principles of Commercial Contracts in West and Central Africa, 9 UNIFORM L. REV. 269,
270 (2004).
91. See id.
92. See Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, art. 6 (2), June 3,
1991, 30 I.L.M. 1241 [hereinafter AEC Treaty].
93. See id. art. 3(e).
94. See generally JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVIDENCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED
193-95 (1965); H.L.A. HART, CONCEPT OF LAw 100-23 (1994); HANS KELSEN, GENERAL
THEORY OF NORMS 252-65 (Michael Hartney trans., 1991). These writers captured the
element of ultimate authority in a legal system differently: While Hart saw it in terms of
a secondary rule of recognition, Austin discussed it in terms of the existence of a sover-
eign, and Kelsen saw it in terms of a basic norm or ground norm. For an analysis of
economic organizations as legal systems, see F.E. Dowrick, A Model of the European Com-
munities' Legal System, 3 Y.B EUR. L. 169 (1983); Mark L. Jones, The Legal Nature of the
European Community: A Jurisprudential Analysis Using H.L.A Hart's Model of Law and a
Legal System, 17 CORNELL INr'L. LJ. 1 (1984); David Palmeter, The WTO as a Legal System,
24 FoRDHAM INT'L. L.J. 444 (2000); Richard F. Oppong, Observing the Legal System of the
Community: The Relationship between Community and National Legal Systems under the African
Economic Community Treaty, 15 TUL. J. INT'L. & CoMP. L. 41 (2006).
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acteristic on the relationship between the national legal systems
of the Member States and the AEC's legal system remains to be
seen. Europe's experience with the doctrine of direct effect and
supremacy of EC law9" demonstrates that the affirmation of the
AEC as a legal system has serious implications for the operation
of Community law within national legal systems.96 It will subject
the legal systems of the Member States to the norms of the Com-
munity legal system in areas within the competence of the Com-
munity.
Under the AEC Treaty, Community law may apply automati-
cally within national legal systems.97 Article 10 provides that de-
cisions of the Assembly are "automatically enforceable" thirty
days after being signed by the Chairman of the Assembly.9"
Under Article 13, Regulations of the Council of Ministers, which
must be approved by the Assembly, are also "automatically en-
forceable" thirty days after signature by the Chairman of the
Council. 99 These provisions suggest the direct application of As-
sembly decisions and Council Regulations in Member States. Es-
pecially in dualist countries, these provisions will not be subject
to any further national implementation measure before the
courts; and private parties can rely on them in litigation.
While the automatic enforceability of Community law with-
in the national legal system of the Member States is explicit, the
same cannot be said of the supremacy of Community law. t" ° In
this regard, the approach of the AEC Treaty contrasts sharply
with the other regional arrangements noted in this Article,
95. The European experience offers invaluable lessons for the African Economic
Community ("AEC") given the fact that, although not expressly stated, the AEC is
modeled after it. There are no doubt differences in both communities in terms of
institutional structure, membership, and historical background. Indeed, the AEC is still
in its formative stages. Nonetheless, the EU, as perhaps the most advanced and success-
ful initiative for economic integration, cannot be ignored in any attempt at economic
integration. See generally Craig Jackson, Constitutional Structure and Governance Strategies
for Economic Integration in Africa and Europe, 13 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139
(2003).
96. See id. at 159.
97. See Gino J. Naldi & Konstantinos D. Magliveras, The African Economic Commu-
nity: Emancipation for African States or Yet Another Glorious Failure?, 24 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
CoM. Rac. 601, 620-21 (1999).
98. See AEC Treaty, supra note 92, art. 10(3).
99. See id. art. 13(3).
100. See id. art. 5; see also Naldi & Magliveras, supra note 97, at 620-21.
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which are very explicit on the question of supremacy. 10 1 The
silence of the AEC Treaty imitates a similar silence on this issue
in the Treaty of the European Economic Community. 102 This
author has argued elsewhere that the supremacy of Community
law can be inferred from the text and purpose of the AEC
Treaty.103 This argument borrows from the jurisprudence and
interpretive approach of the European Court of Justice when
faced with a similar question on the supremacy of EC law within
the legal systems of the Member States.10 4 The supremacy of
Community law under the AEC Treaty can be inferred from the
following facts: (i) the AEC Treaty constitutes the Community as
a legal system and obliges Member States to observe this legal
system; (ii) Article 5 of the Treaty requires Member States to
refrain from unilateral activities that will hinder the attainment
of the objectives of the Community; (iii) decisions and regula-
tions of the Community are automatically enforceable in Mem-
ber States; (iv) conflicting national laws hinder the realization of
the objectives of the Community; (v) the Community espouses
the division of competence between itself and the Member
States; and (vi) the Treaty requires the harmonization of poli-
cies.1 05 If the Court of Justice of the African Union 10 6 ultimately
101. See supra notes 49-50, 75-77 and accompanying text.
102. See Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11.
103. See Oppong, supra note 94; see also Naldi & Magliveras, supra note 97, at 620.
104. In Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., the ECJ held that the EEC Treaty, because of its
special and original nature, could not be overridden by domestic legal provisions, how-
ever framed, without being deprived of its character as Community law and without the
legal basis of the Community itself being called into question. See Case 6/64, [1964]
E.C.R. 585, 599-600.
105. See supra notes 92-93, 98-100 and accompanying text.
106. There is some uncertainty to as to whether the Court of Justice of the African
Union, established under the Protocol of the Court ofJustice of the African Union will
perform the work of the Court ofJustice of the Community established under Article 18
of the AEC Treaty. See Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union, July 11,
2003, http://www.africa-union.org (last visited Nov. 20, 2006). Given that the AEC is an
integral part of the African Union, that there is a trend towards having a single multi-
purpose court, as evidenced by the merger of the African Court of Human and Peoples
Rights with the African Union Court, and that there is need to cut down on cost, it is
unlikely that any other court will be established. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the African
Union Court that covers "the interpretation, application or validity of Union treaties [of
which the AEC Treaty is one] and all subsidiary legal instruments adopted within the
framework of the Union" is wide enough to encompass the work of the AEC Court. See
id. art. 19(1) (a). Unless this is the case, difficult questions of jurisdiction will arise and
the potential for conflict between the two courts exists.
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accepts these arguments, the AEC will become the ultimate evi-
dence of a trend towards supranationalism' in Africa. It will be
evidence that Member States have surrendered part of their sov-
ereignty for the effective operation of this continent-wide eco-
nomic integration initiative.
D. International Law and National Courts
1. Reliance on Unincorporated Treaties
It is a fundamental principle of the common law that a
treaty does not have the force of law within the national legal
system unless implemented by domestic legislation."t 7 This prin-
ciple is founded on the doctrine of the separation of executive
and legislative powers."' 8 In recent times, however, some na-
tional courts in Africa have demonstrated a willingness to rely on
international human rights conventions in adjudication, even
when they have not been incorporated into the national legal
system. In Unity Dow v. Attorney General,109 the Court's interpreta-
tion of the relevant legislation was "strengthened" by the fact
that Botswana was a signatory to the Organization of African
Unity ("OAU") Convention on Non-Discrimination, even though
the judge expressly acknowledged that Botswana had not ratified
it. The Court also cited the U.N. General Assembly Declaration
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women in reach-
ing its decision. 1 0° On appeal, the Attorney General specifically
took issue with the trial court's use of unincorporated treaties.11'
The Court of Appeal, however, affirmed the High Court's reli-
ance on these international instruments." 2 With words that
seem to cast doubt on the thinking that unincorporated treaties
do not confer rights on individuals, Justice Austin Amissah held
that, "even if it is accepted that those treaties and conventions do
not confer enforceable rights on individuals within the state un-
107. See, e.g., The Parlement Belge, [1879] 4 P.D. 129, 154-55; Canada (Attorney
General) v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1937] A.C. 326, 347.
108. See StAw, supra note 8, at 135-36.
109. 13 Hum. Rts. Q. 614 (High Court Bots. 1991).
110. See id. At 624-26.
111. See Dow v. Attorney General, 103 I.L.R. 128, 159 (C.A. Bots. 1992).
112. See id. at 159-62, 175-79. In this case the applicant challenged the constitu-
tionality of provisions of the Citizenship Act of 1984 as being discriminatory and an
infringement on her constitutional ights and freedoms. These provisions, in essence,
denied citizenship to children born to female citizens of Botswana who were married to
foreign men.
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til parliament has legislated its provisions of the law," t" 3 they
could be used as aids to construction. Similarly, in the Ghanaian
case of New Patriotic Party v. Inspector General of Police,114 Chief Jus-
tice Philip Archer held that the fact that Ghana had not passed
specific legislation to give effect to the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights did not mean it could not be relied
upon."' In the Nigerian case of Abacha v. Fawehinmi,1 6 the Su-
preme Court accepted that an unincorporated treaty might give
rise to a legitimate expectation by citizens that the government,
in its acts affecting them, would observe the terms of the
Treaty.' 17 The jurisprudence on the doctrine of legitimate ex-
pectation significantly relaxes the rule that an unincorporated
treaty cannot confer rights or impose duties in domestic law."' 8
113. Id. at 161 (emphasis added).
114. [1993-94] 2 G.L.R. 459, 466. In this case, the applicant challenged the consti-
tutionality of various provisions of the Public Order Decree of 1972 (NRCD 68) as con-
stituting an infringement on the right to assembly and association. In essence, these
provisions required consent of the police before a public procession or meeting could
be held. It granted the Minister of Interior and the Police the power to withhold such
permission. In comparison, in Chihana v. Republic, M.S.C.A. Criminal Appeal No. 9 of
1992 (unreported), the Malawi Supreme Court held that the U.N. Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights is part of the law of Malawi, but the African Charter on Human
and People's Rights is not, and added:
Malawi may well be a signatory to the Charter and as such is expected to re-
spect the provisions of the Charter but until Malawi takes legislative measures
to adopt it, the Charter is not part of the municipal law of Malawi and we
doubt whether in the absence of any local statute incorporating its provision
the Charter would be enforceable in our Courts.
115. See Neville Botha & Michele Olivier, Ten Years of International Law in South
African Courts: Reviewing the Past and Assessing the Future, 29 S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 42
(2004) for other cases in South Africa where courts have relied on various unincorpo-
rated treaties in adjudication. In these cases, unlike the Ghana and Botswana cases, the
reliance had a constitutional foundation, because South African courts are constitution-
ally mandated to consider international law in adjudication.
116. SeeAbachav. Fawehinmi, [2001] AHRLR 172 (S.C. Nig. 2000). In Abacha, the
respondent sought a declaration that his arrest and detention without charge contra-
vened provisions of the 1979 Constitution of Nigeria and the African Charter of Human
and Peoples' Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act of 1983. See id. at 172-73.
117. See id. Delivering the lead judgment, Justice Michael Ekundayo Ogundare
cited with approval the Privacy Council opinion in Higgs v. Minister of National Security.
See id. at 173 (discussing that the effect of an unincorporated treaty "might have an
indirect effect upon the construction of statutes or might give rise to a legitimate expectation
by citizens that the government, in its acts affecting them, would observe the terms of
the treaty," and adding that this "represents the correct position of the law, not only in
England but in Nigeria as well.") (quoting Higgs, [2000] Wkly. L. Rep. 1368, 1375
(2000)) (emphasis added).
118. The application of the doctrine of legitimate expectation to unincorporated
treaties appears to have originated in the High Court of Australia's decision in Minister
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These decisions are remarkable, especially coming from
common law jurisdictions where treaties do not ordinarily have
any effect unless incorporated into national law. They reveal
preparedness on the part of courts to go beyond the traditional
use of unincorporated treaties as aids to interpretation."l 9 The
courts appear to suggest that unincorporated treaties may create
enforceable rights in national law. The cases thus attach na-
tional significance to the international act of ratifying treaties.
Furthermore, unlike the other African countries noted be-
low, there are no explicit constitutional provisions allowing the
courts in those countries to rely on international law in adjudica-
tion. 1 2 0 Thus, it can be argued that their reliance on unincorpo-
rated treaties represents an assertion by the judicial branch of
autonomy from both the legislature and the executive, who are
responsible for treaties and their incorporation into national
law. 12 1 Indeed, the language of the courts-"strengthened," "re-
lied upon," and give rise to "legitimate expectation"-gets
stronger with each judgment. 22 The scope of the language is
for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh, 183 C.L.R. 273 (1995). The doctrine has been
received in England. See, e.g., R (on the application of Lika) v. Sec'y of State for the
Home Dep't, [2002] EWCA Civ. 1855, 29; Thomas v. Baptiste [1999] 3 Wkly. L. Rep.
249, 260-63 (P.C. 1999) (appeal taken from Trin. & Tobago); R v. Uxbridge Magis. Ct.,
[2000] 3 Wkly. L. Rep. 434, 455-56 (Q.B) (2000). In South Africa, one writer has ar-
gued against the extension of the doctrine to unincorporated treaties. See George N.
Barrie, Legitimate Expectation and International Treaties, 114 S. AFR. L.J. 474, 480 (1997).
In Canada, the doctrine did not receive much attention in Baker v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817. Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dub6 left
open the question whether an international instrument ratified by Canada could give
rise to a legitimate expectation. See id. at 841. In New Zealand, two models have been
developed for using unincorporated treaties, especially in administrative decision-mak-
ing. These are the mandatory relevant consideration model and the presumption of
consistency model. While the former focuses on the decision-making process, the latter
looks to the outcome of the decision. See generally Claudia Geiringer, Tavita and All
That: Confronting the Confusion Surrounding Unincorporated Treaties and Administrative
Law, 21 N.Z.U.L.R. 67 (2004). On the possibility of a legitimate expectation giving rise
to a substantive and not merely a procedural benefit, see R v. N. & E. Devon Health
Auth., [2000] 2 Wkly. L. Rep. 622, 644-46 (1999).
119. At common law unincorporated treaties could be used as aids to interpreta-
tion but could not give rise to substantive or procedurally enforceable rights for the
individual, a possibility these dicta leave open. See SHAW, supra note 8, at 393-408.
120. See, e.g., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA (1992); THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA (1992); CONSTITUTION (1999) (Nigeria).
121. See Yuval Shany, How Supreme is the Supreme Law of the Land? Comparative Analy-
sis of the Influence of International Human Rights Treaties Upon the Interpretation of Constitu-
tional Texts by Domestic Courts, 31 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 341, 376-89 (2006).
122. See Abacha, [2001] AHRLR at 176 (quoting Higgs, [2000] Wkly L. Rep. at
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broad, and pregnant with serious implications for the enforce-
ment of international law in national courts. 23 For example, the
extension of the doctrine of legitimate expectation to "unincor-
porated treaties" represents a significantly broad interpretation
of the categories of "promise or practice" which define the scope
of application of the doctrine. 24 Additionally, the doctrine of
legitimate expectation has the potential to confer not only pro-
cedural but also, and more importantly, substantive benefits on
litigants. Application of the doctrine limits the exercise of statu-
tory discretion and raises difficult questions on the role ofjudges
as law or policy makers.1 25
As governments become increasingly involved in interna-
tional agreements in such fields as contracts, financial regula-
tion, trade, and transportation, which are intended to regulate
relationships between individuals and significantly affect their
actions, 12 6 these decisions may become important for individu-
als. They offer some hope for individuals whose governments
readily ratify international treaties, but hesitate to incorporate
them into national law. 12 7 In Africa, this problem has been at-
tributed partly to the absence of clear constitutional provisions
1375); New Patriotic Party v. Inspector General of Police, 2 G.L.R. 459, 482 (1994); Dow
v. Attorney General, 13 Hum. Rts. Q. 614, 623 (High Court Bots. 1991).
123. What is suggested here is more than the mere use of unincorporated treaties
as an aid to interpretation. See generally Tiyanjana Maluwa, International Law as an Aid to
the Interpretation and Application of Law in Municipal Legal Systems of Africa, in THE JUDICI-
ARY IN AFRICA 47-63 (B. Ajibola & D.H. van Zyl eds., 1998); Stephane Beaulac, National
Application of International Law: The Statutory Interpretation Perspective, 41 CAN. Y.B. INT'L
L. 225 (2003).
124. Although treaties are promises, they are ordinarily promises among States
and unlike domestic legislative measures are often not addressed to individuals as such.
Additionally as Taggart has noted in his comment on the Teoh case, "to equate ratifica-
tion of a treaty with a 'promise' or 'representation' to the people of Australia is a large
leap." See Michael Taggart, Legitimate Expectation and Treaties in the High Court of Austra-
lia, 112 L.Q.R. 50, 51 (1996).
125. See id. at 53.
126. In Lika, the Court, in declining to hold that the ratification of the Dublin
Convention created a legitimate expectation, noted that the Convention was not in-
tended to confer benefits on individuals, but to ascertain which State should deal with
an asylum claim. See R (on the application of Lika) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't
[2002] EWCA Civ. 1855, 20-21. This suggests that, had the convention been in-
tended to confer benefits on individuals, legitimate expectation may have been
founded on it even absent a domestic implementing legislation.
127. See A.O. Adede, Africa in International Law: Key Issues of the Second Millennium
and Likely Trends in the Third Millenium, 10 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 352,
367-68 (2000).
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addressing the issue. 12 Another factor may be the domestic cost
in terms of resources needed to secure compliance with obliga-
tions assumed under international treaties. 129 These decisions
signal to the executive that the ratifications of treaties are not
mere platitudinous acts, and that they may have significant na-
tional effects. It is possible that this may make the executive
more circumspect in decisions to ratify treaties.
Reliance on unincorporated treaties involves an assertion of
judicial autonomy that only exists to a very limited degree in the
application or use of customary international law in domestic ad-
judication.130 This is especially true in countries without consti-
tutional provisions making customary international law part of
the national legal system.' From both the transformation or
incorporation approaches, customary international law is ap-
plied only when it is part of the national law, unlike an unincor-
porated treaty, which is never part of national law. Indeed, the
fact of unincorporation may be a manifestation of parliamentary
resistance to the treaty. By giving effect to it absent a national
implementing measure, the judiciary may be indirectly setting
itself up against the will of an elected branch of government or
upsetting the balance of power between the various organs of
government.1 32 At another level, giving effect to unincorporated
treaties indirectly allows the executive to change the law without
any intervention from the legislature, which is the law-making
body. This will unwittingly enhance the powers of the executive
at the expense of the legislature by adding indirect law-making
powers to its competence. As treaties become more important
in domestic law, these power relation issues will become more
prominent in Africa. 33
128. See A.O. Adede, Constitutionalism, Culture and Tradition: African Experiences on
the Incorporation of Treaties into Domestic Law, 7 AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 239, 245 (1999).
129. See generally Oona A. Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1821
(2003).
130. See generally Tom Ginsburg, Bounded Discretion in International Judicial Lawmak-
ing, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 631 (2005).
131. For examples of countries with constitutional provisions that make customary
international law part of national law, see infra Part I.E.
132. See Ginsburg, supra note 130, at 633.
133. See Craig Jackson, The African Union and the New Pan-Africanism: Rushing to
Organize or Timely Shift: Constitutional Structure and Governance Strategies for Economic Inte-
gration in Africa and Europe, 13 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 163-71 (2003).
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2. Reference to Decisions of International Tribunals
Aside from relying on unincorporated treaties, some domes-
tic courts have utilized the decisions of international tribunals in
their domestic adjudication.1 3 ' These tribunals include the In-
ternational Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court
for the Former Yugoslavia, the European Court of Justice, the
European Court of Human Rights, and the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights. 3 ' The use to which decisions from
these international tribunals are put ranges from mere reference
to direct application. 36 The jurisprudence on which the na-
tional courts rely relates to both the existence and the inter-
pretation of existing international norms.137 As Mohammed
Bedjaoui suggests, with this technique, the "rampart of State sov-
ereignty is breached, thus enabling the norm or the judicial de-
cision to pass from the international legal order into the munici-
pal legal order."1 31 In this respect, it is significant that the inter-
national tribunal may be one to which the State in question has
not consented or in whose formation the State has in any way
participated. 3 ' Indeed, decisions of international tribunals are,
ordinarily, binding only on the parties to the litigation. 40 Addi-
134. See generally ANN-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, 65-103 (2004)
[hereinafter SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER]; Ann-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Trans-
judicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REv. 99, 99-100 (1994-1995) [hereinafter Slaugh-
ter, Transjudicial Communication].
135. See, e.g., SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 134, at 150 (noting the
strengthening of the International Criminal Court's evolution by the blending of inter-
national and domestic jurisprudence); Mohammed Bedjaoui, The Reception by National
Courts of Decisions of International Tribunals, in INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NA-
TIONAL COURTS 21, 31 (Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds., 1996) (providing a
discussion of national courts using the jurisprudence of the International Court ofJus-
Lice in their own decisions); Slaughter, Transjudicial Communication, supra note 134, at
37, 44-45 (discussing incorporation of European Court of Justice and European Court
of Human Rights decisions into national jurisprudence).
136. See Slaughter, Transjudicial Communication, supra note 134, at 118-19; see also
Bedjaoui, supra note 135, at 29.
137. See Bedjaoui, supra note 135, at 29.
138. Id. at 23.
139. See id. at 28.
140. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, art. 59
(stating "[t]he decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties
and in respect of that particular case"); see also Philip V. Tisne, The ICJ and Municipal
Law: The Precedential Effect of the Avena and Lagrand Decisions in U.S. Courts, 29 FORDHAM
INT'L LJ. 865 (2006) (arguing that I.C.J. decisions are "binding" only as a matter of
international law). But see Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court ofJustice, art.
22, Feb. 14. 2000, http://www.caricom.org/jsp/secretariat/legalinstruments/agree-
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tionally, unlike the relationship between some international
tribunals and domestic courts (for example, between the Euro-
pean Court of Justice or the European Court of Human Rights
and domestic courts of Member States who are parties to the
relevant treaty), there is no formal State-treaty-mandated rela-
tionship between these African national courts and the interna-
tional courts from which they are borrowing. t4 Thus, this is an-
other manifestation of independence or an "autonomous self-
conception" on the part of thejudiciary.'4 2 This conception may
reflect a belief in a shared judicial goal of ensuring justice for all
irrespective of the source from which the norm that will facilitate
this goal emanates, and a desire on the part of the national
courts to enhance their "legitimacy" in the eyes of the interna-
tional community by acting as enforcers of international val-
ues.
1 4 3
The trend of relying on decisions of international tribunals
is evident from an examination of law reports in Africa.144 For
example, between January 2000 and August 2005 there are
about fifty reported cases in which South African courts made
use of decisions from various international tribunals. 145 This use
ment ccj.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2006) (providing that "[]udgments of the [Carib-
bean Court of Justice] shall be legally binding precedents for parties in proceedings
before the Court").
141. See Maluwa, supra note 1, at 56-57.
142. Slaughter, Transjudicial Communication, supra note 134, at 123.
143. See Reem Bahdi, Globalization ofJudgment: Transjudicialism and the Five Faces of
International Law in Domestic Courts, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 555, 556-57 (2002)
(noting five reasons domestic judges give for relying on non-binding international
norms: "(1) concern for the rule of law; (2) desire to promote universal values; (3)
reliance on international law to help uncover values inherent within the domestic re-
gime; (4) willingness to invoke the logic of judges in other jurisdictions; and (5) con-
cern to avoid negative assessments from the international community"); Slaughter,
Transjudicial Communication, supra note 134, at 127-28.
144. This examination was limited to the Index of the relevant reports. Although
the limitations of such an approach are obvious, it serves the purpose here of revealing
an awareness of the significance of the jurisprudence of these tribunals and a prepared-
ness on the part of counsel and judges to benefit from it.
145. The relevant cases are listed at the start of each volume. See 4 S. African L.
Rep. lxxvii, lxxviii-lxxix (2005); 3 S. African L. Rep. lxviii, lxx (2005); 2 S. African L.
Rep. xxxiii, xxxiv (2005); 1 S. African L. Rep. lxv, lxvi-lxvii (2005); 6 S. African L. Rep.
lxvi, lxvi, lxviii-lxix (2004); 5 S. African L. Rep. lxvi, lxvii (2004); 4 S. African L. Rep.
lxxv, lxxvi-lxxvii (2004); 3 S. African L. Rep. lxxv, lxxviii (2004); 1 S. African L. Rep.
lxxiii, lxxiv (2004); 6 S. African L. Rep. lxxxvi, lxxxix (2003); 5 S. African L. Rep. lxxx-
viii, lxxxix-xc (2003); 3 S. African L. Rep. lxxxix, xci-xcii (2003); 1 S. African L. Rep.
lxxxvii, lxxxvii (2003); 6 S. African L. Rep. lxxxiv, lxxxv (2002); 4 S. African L. Rep. xci,
xcii (2002); 2 S. African L. Rep. xcvii, xcix (2002); 1 S. African L. Rep. xciii, xciv (2002);
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ranged from mere reference to direct application. One case
made reference to two decisions of the African Human Rights
Commission, which is not a court.14 6 A similar trend is revealed
in the African Human Rights Law Reports.147
At a time when courts in countries such as the United States
have been accused of being oblivious to international law, and
others questioned for their reliance on it, 148 this judicial attitude
in Africa may be lauded as a triumph for international law. Criti-
cism can be levied, however, on the absence of reliance on deci-
sions of international courts in Africa, such as the Common Mar-
ket for Eastern and Southern Africa ("COMESA") Court of Jus-
tice, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, or even the African Commission
which, although not a court, has been providing some instruc-
tive human rights jurisprudence. 149 While the decided cases
4 S. African L. Rep. xlix, lii (2001); 4 S. African L. Rep. cl, clv (2001); 3 S. African L.
Rep. xxxvi (2000); 3 S. African L. Rep. lii, liv (2001); 2 S. African L. Rep. cxxxvi, cxl
(2001); 1 S. African L. Rep. cxxxii, cxxxvi (2001); 4 S. African L. Rep. cxv, cxviii-cxix
(2000); 3 S. African L. Rep. cxxii, cxxv (2000).
146. See 6 S. African L. Rep. xxxvi, xxxvi (2004) (referring to President of the Republic
of South Africa v. Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd., 2004 (6) SA 40 (SCA) at 44 (S. Afr.)).
147. This Report reports cases from all African countries including decisions of
the African Human Rights Commission. See, e.g., International Case Law, State Reports Etc
Considered, 2000 AiR. HUM. RTS. L. REP. lv (2000) (listing decisions of the African Com-
mission on Human and Peoples' Rights). An examination of the "[i]nternational case
law, state reports etc. considered" section of the Report reveals that between 2000 and
2002 various national courts made reference to sixty-five decisions from international
tribunals and commissions such as the United Nations Human Rights Committee, the
European Commission of Human Rights, and the Inter-American Commission of
Human Rights. See, e.g., id. at lviii (citing to the European Commission of Human
Rights).
148. See DonaldJ. Kochan, Sovereignty and the American Courts at the Cocktail Party of
International Law: The Dangers of Domestic Invocations of Foreign and International Law, 29
FORD-AM INT'L L.J. 507, 507 (2006) (describing reliance on international law in domes-
tic adjudication as "inappropriate, undemocratic, and dangerous"). See generally Sympo-
sium, International Law and the 2003-04 Supreme Court Term: Building Bridges or Construct-
ing Barriers Between National, Foreign, and International Law: The Supreme Court, Constitu-
tional Courts and the Role of International Law in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 12 TULSA J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 109 (2004); Henry Burmester & Susan Reye, The Place of Customary
International Law in Australian Law: Unfinished Business, 21 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 39
(2001); Hilary Charlesworth et al., Deep Anxieties: Australia and the International Legal
Order, 25 SYDNEY L. REV. 423 (2003); Treasa Dunworth, Hidden Anxieties: Customary Inter-
national Law in New Zealand, 2 N.Z. J. PUB. & INT'L L. 67 (2004); Shane S. Monks, In
Defence of the Use of International Law by Australian Courts, 22 AUSTL. Y.B. INTr'L L. 201
(2002).
149. See generally Rachel Murray, International Human Rights: Neglect of Perspectives
from African Institutions, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 193 (2005). Some judgments of the
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before these African international tribunals are relatively few,
they do exist, and their contribution to jurisprudence and inter-
national law should be recognized and relied on, where appro-
priate, by other national courts in Africa.' 5 °
In some jurisdictions in Africa, the reference to interna-
tional decisions has constitutional foundation. Article 11(2) of
the Malawi Constitution allows the courts to "have regard to cur-
rent norms of public international law and comparable foreign
case law" in interpreting the Constitution.' 5 ' Under Article
39 (1) of the South Africa Constitution, in interpreting the Bill of
Rights, courts must consider international law and may consider
foreign law. 15 2 Article 233 of the South Africa Constitution also
enjoins the courts to prefer interpretations that are consistent
with international law.' 53  However, not all countries have
showed a willingness to accept this new judicial attitude. For ex-
ample, Section 111 (b) of the Zimbabwe Constitution, inserted in
1993, provides that:
Commission are reported in the African Human Rights Law Reports and the South
African Journal on Human Rights. See, e.g., African Commission Decisions According to Com-
munication Numbers, 2000 AFR. HUM. RTS. L. REP. lix (2000) (listing decisions of African
Commission).
150. For a sample of the jurisprudence of the COMESA Court of Justice, see
Muleya v. Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (No. 3), 2003 LLR 12
(COMESA) (adjudicating on the tort of libel); Muleya v. Common Market for Eastern
and Southern Africa, 2001 LLR 10 (COMESA) (ruling on the remedies for breach of
contract of personal service); Muleya v. Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa, 2001 LLR 1 (COMESA) (ruling on amendment of pleadings); Republic of Ke-
nya v. Coastal Aquaculture, 2001 LLR 11 (COMESA) (adjudicating on locus standi and
the exhaustion of local remedies); Ogang v. Eastern and Southern African Trade and
Development Bank, [2002] LLR 9 (COMESA) (ruling on judicial bias); Eastern and
Southern African Trade and Development Bank v. Ogang, 2000 LLR 5 (COMESA) (rul-
ing on privileges and immunities of an international institution); Eastern and Southern
African Trade and Development Bank v. Ogang, 2000 LLR 8 (COMESA) (adjudicating
on judicial review). On the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, see Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4, Summary of Judgment (Sept.
2, 1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1399 (1998) (defining rape in international law and
discussing how rape can amount to genocide); Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No.
ICTR-97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence (Sept. 4, 1998) (ruling on official responsibility
for genocide and definition of crimes against humanity); Prosecutor v. Nahimana,
Barayagwiza, & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence (Dec. 3, 2003)
(ruling on the responsibility ofjournalists for genocide). See also Kithure Kindiki, Contri-
butions of the International Tribunal for Rwanda to the Development of International Humanita-
rian Law, 33 ZAMBIA L.J. 35 (2001).
151. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MALAWI 1994, art. 11(2).
152. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, art. 39(1).
153. Id. art. 233.
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Except as otherwise provided by this Constitution or by or
under an Act of Parliament, any convention, treaty or agree-
ment acceded to, concluded or executed by or under the au-
thority of the President with one or more foreign states or
governments or international organizations... shall not form
part of the law of Zimbabwe unless it has been incorporated
into the law by or under an Act of Parliament.154
As Tiyanjana Maluwa has suggested, this provision was clearly
aimed at preventing courts from invoking international law."'
E. International Law and National Constitutions
There is also a trend towards the adoption of "international
law-friendly" constitutions' 56 among some African countries.'57
Especially in Anglophone Africa, there seems to be a gradual
abandonment of the practice of "avoiding the constitutional in-
corporation of international law altogether." '158 Article 144 of
Constitution 1990 of Namibia can be said to represent the first
manifestation of these international law-friendly constitutions.159
It states: "[U]nless otherwise provided by this Constitution or
Act of Parliament, the general rules of public international law
and international agreements binding upon Namibia under this
Constitution shall form part of the law of Namibia."'16 The 1992
Constitution of Cape Verde is more far reaching; Article 11 pro-
vides:
General or common international law, insofar as it is in force
in the international legal order, shall be an integral part of
the Capeverdean legal order . . . . [L]egal acts emanated
from the relevant organs of the supranational organizations
of which Cape Verde is a member, shall enter directly into
154. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE 1993, art. 111(b).
155. See Maluwa, supra note 1, at 64.
156. Erasmus, supra note 1, at 93. For a discussion of some of these constitutions,
see Maluwa, supra note 1.
157. See Maluwa, supra note 1, at 46. French colonies have traditionally had provi-
sions incorporating international law into the domestic law. See id. at 55-56 (listing
these countries). See generally FELIX CHUKS OKOYE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NEW AFRm-
CAN STATES 21-45 (1972) (describing the relationship between international and na-
tional law in early post-independent Africa).
158. Maluwa, supra note 1, at 56. Examples of these countries are South Africa,
Malawi, and Kenya. Id. However, the proposed Kenyan Constitution of 2005 was re-
jected. See Lacey, supra note 52.
159. Maluwa, supra note 1, at 46.
160. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA 1990, art. 144
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force in the domestic legal order, provided that that is so es-
tablished in the respective constitutive instruments. The
rules and principles of general or common international law
and of conventional international law, validly approved or rat-
ified, shall prevail after their entry into force in the interna-
tional and domestic legal orders, over all legislative and do-
mestic normative acts of an infra-constitutional value.1 61
The 1993 Interim Constitution162 and Articles 39(1) and 233 of
the 1996 South African Constitution provide yet more evidence
of these international law-friendly constitutions.1 63 It has been
noted that, if the general rules of public international law in the
Namibia Constitution are interpreted narrowly to exclude cus-
tomary international law, then the fact that the South African
provision extends to the incorporation of customary interna-
tional law makes it a first, since no similar provision in other
constitutions in Africa exists. 1 6 4 By specifying that customary law
is part of the law of the country, the provision puts to an end the
debate over whether customary law is part of the domestic law by
virtue of incorporation or transformation.
These provisions in the constitutions of Namibia and South
Africa can be said to represent an acknowledgement of the spe-
cial role international law played in the struggles for indepen-
dence and against apartheid in these two countries. 165 Interna-
tional law is seen as providing a neutral foundation for develop-
ment of a new legal order distinct from the old one that was
marked by apartheid. 16 6 Reaching out to international law also
serves as a means of becoming part of the global community af-
ter decades of isolation.
These constitutional provisions appear to be inspiring some
common law countries that traditionally have avoided such pro-
visions, 1 6 7 for example, Malawi and Kenya. Under Article 211(3)
161. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAPE VERDE 1992, art. 11. Although this
provision appears to be more far reaching than that of other national constitutions, the
difficulty is ascertaining the limits of its scope due to the use of concepts (e.g. com-
mon/conventional international law, supranational, infra-constitutional) without defi-
nition. Id.
162. S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST. 1993, art. 35, 116(2), 226(7), 231(1), 231(4).
163. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, arts. 39(1) and 233.
164. Maluwa, supra note 1, at 45-46.
165. Georges Abi-Saab, Namibia and International Law: An Overview, 1 AFR. Y.B. OF
INT'L L. 3 (1993).
166. Id. at 4-5.
167. See generally Brian R. Opeskin, Constitutional Modelling: The Domestic Effect of
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of the Malawi Constitution of 1994, customary international law,
unless inconsistent with this Constitution or an Act of Parlia-
ment, is acknowledged to have continued application and is ac-
cordingly part of the laws of Malawi. 6 ' In Kenya, Article 3 of the
Proposed Constitution 2005 listed customary law, international
agreements applicable to Kenya, as well as the laws of the East
African Community as part of the laws of Kenya.'69 Although
this proposed constitution was rejected," v° its provisions on inter-
national law represented another manifestation of Africa's grow-
ing international law friendliness. It is hoped that ultimately this
provision will find its way into the Kenya constitution and that of
other African countries.
The idea of international law-friendly constitutions in Africa
should not be confined to the express inclusion of international
law as part of national law. International law continues to influ-
ence the structure and workings of many national constitu-
tions."' One area where this manifests itself is the incorpora-
tion of human rights and environmental law provisions into all
the emerging constitutions on the continent. 17 2 Human rights
provisions inspired by various international human rights instru-
ments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, and the Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, are now routinely incorpo-
rated into national constitutions in Africa. 173
These constitutional provisions put courts on a more solid
foundation when using international law in domestic adjudica-
tion, both as an interpretive device and for the creation or con-
ferment of substantive rights. Indeed, some of the constitutions
specifically enjoin the judiciary to have regard to international
International Law in Commonwealth Countries, 2000 PuB. L. 607, 607-26 (2000); Brian R.
Opeskin, Constitutional Modelling: The Domestic Effect of International Law in Commonwealth
Countries Part II, 2001 PUB. L. 97, 97-114 (2001), reprinted in 27 COMMW. L. BULL. 1242,
1242-60 [hereinafter Opeskin, Constitutional Modelling Part II].
168. CONST. OF MALAWI 1994, art. 11(2).
169. Proposed New Constitution of Kenya (2005), KENYA GAZErE SUPPLEMENT No.
63 art. 3.
170. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
171. See Maluwa, supra note 1, at 47.
172. See CONST. MALAWI 1994, art. 30 (making provision for internationally con-
tested right to development); Proposed New Constitution of Kenya (2005), KENYA GA-
ZETTE SUPPLEMENT No. 63 art. 67 (providing for various environmental rights).
173. See Mirna E. Adjami, African Courts, International Law and Comparative Case
Law: Chimera or Emerging Human Rights Jurisprudence? 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 103, 110-14.
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law in adjudication. Article 11(2) (c) of the Malawian Constitu-
tion of 1994 provides that, in interpreting the provisions of this
Constitution, a court of law shall, where applicable, have regard
to current norms of public international law and comparable
foreign case law. 174 Arguably, foreign case law is not limited to
foreign domestic cases but can be extended to international
tribunals like the International Court of Justice and the Court of
Justice of the African Union. 175 Article 39(1) of the South Africa
Constitution of 1996 provides that, in interpreting the Bill of
Rights, a court, tribunal, or forum must consider international
law and may consider foreign law.1 76 This provision significantly
expands the reach of international law: It can be used not only
by courts, but also by tribunals and other forums.' 77 Addition-
ally, Article 233 enjoins courts to prefer interpretations that are
consistent with international law.178 These provisions represent
a shift, especially in common law countries, from the situation
where reliance on international law as an aid to interpretation
did not have a direct statutory or constitutional foundation, but
was the result of common law rules.1 7 1
These constitutional provisions also reflect the extent to
which African countries are becoming open to and receptive of
outside normative influences. Arguably, in this era of globaliza-
tion, such openness is inevitable; what is revealing here, how-
ever, is that it is being explicitly acknowledged and fostered.'8 °
Indeed, some writers have sought to find a link between democ-
racy and the influence of international law in national legal sys-
tems.1 81 The belief is that "respect for international law would
174. CONST. MALAWI 1994, art. 11(2)(c).
175. President Arthur Chaskalson drew a distinction, however, between decisions
of foreign countries and those of international tribunals. See S v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3)
SA 391 (CC) at 413, 36 (S. Mr.).
176. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, art. 39(1).
177. See Raylene Keightly, Public International Law and the Final Constitution, 12 S.
AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 405, 415 (1996).
178. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, art. 233.
179. See Maluwa, supra note 1, at 55-57 (noting that, in general, constitutions in
Anglophone countries do not indicate whether or not international law is superior to
municipal law, and that constitutions in Francophone African States explicitly state that
treaties supersede domestic legislation, but are silent on the issue of customary law's
superiority).
180. See MALUWA, supra note 3, at 50 (arguing that constitutional incorporation of
customary international law into municipal law strengthens the protection of human
rights).
181. SeeJos6 E. Alvarez, Why Nations Behave, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 303, 314 (1998)
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arise as a natural corollary to the spread of democracy."' 2 How-
ever contested this linkage may be,183 it cannot be denied that
international law is finding a niche, hitherto unavailable, within
the national legal systems of African countries. The next part
explores some of the implications of this evolving reality.
II. RE-IMAGINING INTERNATIONAL LAW-SOME
SELECTED ISSUES
The above examination provides empirical evidence of the
changing attitudes towards the relationship between interna-
tional and national law in Africa. International law is influenc-
ing and shaping national legal processes and decision-making in
a manner hitherto unknown.' 84 The concept of sovereignty,
which suggests that national legal systems are sealed or isolated
from outside interference, is being re-assessed. 185 The content
of national legal rules also continues to be shaped by interna-
tional law.1 86  Indeed, some have had to be abolished in re-
sponse to the dictates of international law. 87 This is occurring
through the direct incorporation of international laws, such as
in the area of human rights, into national constitutions,' 88 and
(discussing and critiquing the argument that democracies have more compliance with
international agreements than non-democracies).
182. Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth, Introduction: The Spread of Liberal Democracy
and Its Implications for International Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 1, 21-22 (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000) (citing Elihu Root,
The Effect of Democracy on International Law, 4 INT'L CONCILATION 151, 162, 167 (1917-
1918)). Elihu Root, with words that seem to resonate even in our current age, further
stated:
To be safe, democracy must kill its enemy [autocracy] when it can and where
it can. The world can not be half democratic and half autocratic. It must be
all democratic or all Prussian. There can be no compromise. If it is all Prus-
sian, there can be no real international law.
Root, supra, at 166-67.
183. Fox and Roth criticize the "naivet6" of Root's analysis, since he simply as-
sumed the spread of democracy would lead to respect for international law, but ex-
amined neither the reverse causal pathway (i.e. that respect for international law might
promote democracy), nor how the spread of democracy would change the content of
international law. See Fox & Roth, supra note 182, at 22.
184. See supra notes 144-147 and accompanying text.
185. See infta notes 195-199, 202 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., Maluwa, supra note 1, at 62-63 (discussing cases from Botswana,
Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Tanzania in which national courts relied on international con-
ventions and international court decisions in interpreting the constitutions).
187. See infra notes 230, 233-239 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (noting that human rights provi-
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indirectly through judicial decision-making that takes account of
international law. 8' The interaction between the two legal or-
ders is also raising questions of domestic power relations19 ° and
the law-making processes at the international level.' 91 This part
examines some of the issues that arise from the interaction be-
tween these two legal orders.
A. Re-examination of Traditional Understanding of Sovereignty
The dualist conception of the domestic legal system as
sealed from the outside world made international norms not di-
rectly applicable in national legal systems. Under this concep-
tion, allowing rules of international law to operate directly in
municipal law unjustifiably concedes that international law is su-
perior to, and detracts from the authority of, municipal law. 192
This was something a sovereign State, with its legal system, could
not countenance. The above examination, however, reveals a
shift in the traditional understanding of sovereignty as it relates
to the relationship between the international and national legal
systems. It represents a significant shift, even if only in theory,
on the part of countries that were once characterized as "reluc-
tant to incorporate international law directly into their national
constitutions and thereby make it an integral part of their mu-
nicipal law."' 93
Indeed, this re-examination of sovereignty is going on in
both the legal and political realms. The principle of non-inter-
ference in domestic affairs, which was a cardinal principle of the
OAU,1 94 has become a relic of the past upon the coming into
force of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. t95 Under Ar-
sions inspired by various international human rights instruments are now routinely in-
corporated into national constitutions in Africa).
189. See supra notes 109-119, 144-147 and accompanying text (noting that African
courts have relied on both international human rights conventions that were not incor-
porated into the national legal system and decisions of international tribunals).
190. See supra notes 121, 130-133, and accompanying text (arguing that the
courts' reliance on unincorporated treaties is an assertion ofjudicial autonomy, and the
executives' giving effect to unincorporated treaties empowers the executive and the
expense of the legislature).
191. See infra notes 257-266 and accompanying text.
192. See Monks, supra note 148, at 222.
193. Maluwa, supra note 1, at 57.
194. OAU Charter art. 3(2), May 25 1963, http://www.africa-union.org/official_
documents (last visited Nov. 27, 2006).
195. Constitutive Act of the African Union,July 11, 2000, http://www.africa-union.
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ticle 4(h) of the Constitutive Act, Member States recognize "the
right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a
decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances,
namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity."' 9 6
Elsewhere in Africa, in August 2003, members of the Southern
African Development Community ("SADC")' 97 unanimously en-
dorsed a Mutual Defence Pact that gives each nation the right to
intervene in armed attacks on their Member States.1"8 Although
these two instruments are riddled with textual ambiguity, and
remain to be tested in practice, agreement on them represents a
remarkable achievement in Africa.1 9' Indeed, as Yusuf notes, no
other regional organization in Africa has ever incorporated such
a right in its constitutive instrument.200  Saddled with civil con-
org/root/au/AboutAU/Constitutive Act-en.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2006). The Afri-
can Union replaces the Organization of African States ("OAS"). On the structure, char-
acteristics, and workings of the African Union, see generally Konstantinos D. Magliveras
& GinoJ. Naldi, The African Union-A New Dawn for Africa?, 51 INT'L & CoMP. L. Q. 415
(2002); Nsongurua J. Udombana, The Institutional Structure of the African Union: A Legal
Analysis, 33 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 69 (2002-2003); Symposium: The African Union and the New
Pan-Africanism: Rushing to Organize or Timely Shift?, 13 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
1-276 (2003).
196. Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note 195, art. 4(h), amended by
Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 11, 2003,
reprinted in 13 AFR. J. I-r'L & CoMP. L. 37. As amended, Article 4(h) reads:
[T]he right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a deci-
sion of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes,
genocide and crimes against humanity as well as a serious threat to legitimate
order to restore peace and stability to the Member State of the Union upon
the recommendation of the Peace and Security Council.
Id. at 38.
197. This is an economic community of countries in Southern Africa. The com-
munity aims to among other goals, achieve development and economic growth, allevi-
ate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa,
support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration, evolve common politi-
cal values, systems and institutions, and promote and defend peace and security within
the region. See Southern African Development Community, http://www.sadc.int/
home.php (last visited Nov. 11, 2006).
198. SADC Mutual Defense Pact, Aug. 2003, art. 6, http://www.iss.co.za/Af/
RegOrg/unity-to..union/pdfs/sadc/defpact.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2006); see Benja-
min Sirota, Sovereignty and the Southern African Development Community, 5 CHI. J. IN-r'L L.
343, 344 (2004).
199. See generally Tiyanjan Maluwa, Fast-Tracking African Unity or Making Haste
Slowly? A Note on the Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union, 51 NETH. INT'L
L. REv. 195, 215-20 (2004) (arguing for a more cautious view of the new right of inter-
vention); Sirota, supra note 198, at 344; Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, The Right of Intervention by
the African Union: A New Paradigm in Regional Enforcement Action, 11 AR. Y.B. INT' L L. 3
(2003) (arguing for a more positive view of the right of intervention).
200. Yusuf, supra note 199, at 19.
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flicts and human rights abuses that are often neglected by the
international community, these African initiatives hold the po-
tential of securing peace and respect for human rights on the
continent.2 1 How far these new intervention policies will assist
in the reduction of conflicts and promote human rights in Africa
remains to be seen.2 °2 If the recent African Union experience
with the Darfur situation in Sudan is anything to go by, then it
can safely be said that the challenge is monumental. 20 3 The
presence of political will beyond the existence of a text mandat-
ing intervention, the receptiveness of the local population to the
fact of intervention, and the availability of funding for that pur-
pose are crucial if the positive impact of these new policies of
intervention is to be realized.
The efforts at economic integration in Africa may also bene-
fit from the integration of Community law into domestic legal
systems, and the concomitant surrender of sovereignty. 2 4 As
Xavier Forneris has noted:
[S]overeignty transfer is a necessary attribute of any real inte-
gration process . . . . Without its regional grouping would
amount to little more than a loose association of countries-
[sic] no more than a club or forum where governments
might engage in discussions on matters of common interest
and might issue statements and non-binding recommenda-
tions only to rush into unilateral decisions that might end up
being counter to the spirit if not the letter of the joint state-
ments. 205
Arguably, such has been the case of economic integration efforts
201. See id.
202. There are legal and practical difficulties with the right to intervene in a coun-
try even for humanitarian purposes. Such intervention challenges the idea of State
sovereignty, may lead to protracted wars, and can be used for purposes other than hu-
manitarian. All these counsel for caution in the invocation and exercise of this right.
The literature on humanitarian intervention is vast and exciting, but a full examination
of them is beyond the scope of this Article. For a recent discussion of some of the
issues, especially from the perspective of unilateral humanitarian intervention, i.e., in-
tervention without the approval of the U.N. Security Council, see Ryan Goodman, Hu-
manitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 107 (2006).
203. SeeJonathan D. Rechner, From the OAU to the AU: A Normative Shift with Impli-
cationsfor Peacekeeping and Conflict Management, orJust a Name Change?, 39 VAND.J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 543, 570-75 (2006) (discussing the impact the African Union has had on the
situation in Darfur).
204. Forneris, supra note 66, at 3-7 (discussing economic integration and commu-
nity law integration into national law).
205. See id. at 6.
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in Africa. Economic integration in Africa has been character-
ized by weak institutional frameworks, the absence of political
will, and minimal national impact.2° 6 Experience in Europe in-
dicates that as community laws become part of national law, and
individuals begin to make claims founded on them, economic
integration will deepen. 2 7
Re-examining our understanding of sovereignty and how it
impacts on the relationship between international and national
law is important in this age of interdependency and globaliza-
tion. Sovereignty should not be viewed as a zero sum game
where you either retain it or lose it.20  Assertion of sovereignty
should not lead a nation onto the path of legal isolationism. It
may sometimes be necessary to "lose" sovereignty for the general
benefit of all the participants in a common undertaking like an
economic integration. 2 9  The experience of the European
Union demonstrates how individual States can give up a degree
of sovereignty to the advantage of all in this regard.210
B. Respect for International Law
Perhaps no greater problem bedevils international law than
the problem of enforcement, or ensuring compliance with its
norms. 2 11 It is suggested that the changing attitude towards in-
206. See Nsongurua J. Udombana, A Harmony or a Cacophony? The Music of Integra-
tion in the African Union Treaty and the New Partnership for Africa's Development, 13 INn.
INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 185, 202-06 (2002) (discussing the problems of economic inte-
gration in Africa).
207. See id. at 190-91 (discussing how the EU is a model of economic integration
and how the provisions for free movement of workers and goods have deepened eco-
nomic integration).
208. See Neil MacCormick, Beyond the Sovereign State, 56 MOD. L. REv. 1, 16 (1993).
209. SeeJoel P. Trachtman, Reflections on the Nature of the State: Sovereignty, Power and
Responsibility, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 399, 400-01 (1994) (arguing that there is a cost-benefit
analysis that must be done to assess what a State gains in influence once it gives up some
of its autonomy).
210. See id.; Kanishka Jayasuriya, Globalization, Law and the Transformation of Sover-
eignty: The Emergence of Global Regulatory Governance, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 425,
428, 443 (1999) (discussing what has emerged from the formation of the EU in terms of
development of the idea of sovereignty).
211. See generally Mattias Kumm, International Law in National Courts: The Interna-
tional Rule of Law and the Limits of the Internationalist Model, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 19 (2003)
(discussing implementing international law through domestic courts); Oona A.
Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U.
CHI. L. REv. 469, 470, 492 (2005) (discussing the effectiveness of international law de-
spite its apparent lack of enforcement power).
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ternational law in Africa holds greater prospect for the enforce-
ment of international law on the continent.212 The fact that in-
ternational law is often not integrated into national legal systems
poses a strong challenge to its effectiveness. 213 National enforce-
ment is an essential means of increasing respect for and effec-
tiveness of international law.2 4 With the increased acceptance
of international law by national courts, and the direct applica-
tion of international law within national legal systems, private in-
dividuals may be able to make claims founded on it. 215 This will
enhance the effectiveness of international law.21 6 The extension
of the doctrine of legitimate expectation by the courts to unin-
corporated treaties may afford substantive rights to individuals in
litigation before national courts. If international law is constitu-
tionally made part of domestic law, it becomes a relevant consid-
eration in decision-making. 217 This implies, for example, that
the exercise ofjudicial and administrative discretion should take
account of international law, and arguably, produce an outcome
that is consistent with international law.
With the supremacy and automatic enforceability of com-
munity law, individuals may be able to challenge the validity of
domestic legislation and measures that are not in conformity
with the dictates of community law.218 Individuals will become
enforcers of community law, and international law for that mat-
ter, through litigation before national courts. This layer of en-
212. See MALUWA, supra note 3, at 48-51 (finding a correlation between democracy
and an increased incidence of peace and international law oriented foreign policy).
213. See Stemmet, supra note 17, at 47 ("In view of the inadequate enforcement
facilities at the disposal of international law, the effectiveness of the implementation of
international legal rules depends greatly on the enforcement of such rules by domestic
courts.").
214. See id. at 47 ("The status that international law enjoys in domestic legal sys-
tems is largely determined by asking whether rules of international law are automati-
cally incorporated into municipal law and, therefore, have direct effect on citizens and
the courts, or whether an act of transformation must first take place.").
215. SeeJackson, supra note 48, at 322 (stating that individuals can base claims on
some treaty norms without the need for government intervention or an act of transfor-
mation once the treaty has been incorporated into municipal law).
216. See generally id. at 321-27 (arguing that individuals bringing claims to en-
force treaties may be more effective than governmental enforcement due to the latter's
differing institutional imperatives).
217. See MALUWA, supra note 3, at 43-48 (citing CONST. MALAwl 1994, art. 11(2) (c),
which provides that judicial interpretation of its provisions will, "where applicable, have
regard to current norms of public international law and comparable foreign case law").
218. SeeJackson, supra note 48, at 322.
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forcement-individual and national courts-will complement
the efforts of community enforcement institutions such as in the
case of the AEC, the Court of Justice of the African Union. As
Justice Powell once noted, "until international tribunals com-
mand a wider constituency, the courts of the various countries
afford the best means for the development of a respected body
of international law."'219 With international law as part of na-
tional law in some African countries, their national courts have
become forums for the vindication of rights acquired under in-
ternational law, and a channel for securing the discharge by
States of obligations assumed thereunder.2 °
The effectiveness of international law in Africa can be
greatly enhanced if individuals are allowed to rely on interna-
tional law in domestic adjudication and have direct access to in-
ternational tribunals in case of violation of international law.2 2 1
The author has argued elsewhere that individuals can be a force
behind the economic integration efforts in Africa if allowed to
invoke community law before national courts, and to have direct
access to community tribunals.222 Indeed, some economic com-
munities in Africa provide a right of action before their respec-
tive community courts for individuals. 223 Allowing for private
rights of action increases the number of persons who will poten-
tially bring cases before international tribunals, and will save
States the trouble of litigating on behalf of their nationals. 224 It
219. First National City Bank v. Banco National de Cuba 406 U.S. 759, 775 (1971)
(Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
220. See Jackson, supra note 48, at 322; see also Stemmet, supra note 17, at 67.
221. See Jackson, supra note 48, at 322. See also Stemmet, supra note 17, at 67.
222. Oppong, supra note 94.
223. See Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
art. 26, Nov. 5, 1993, http://www.comesa.int (last visited Nov. 27, 2006). Article 26
states that:
Any person who is resident in a Member State may refer for determination by
the Court the legality of any act, regulation, directive, or decision of the Coun-
cil or of a Member State on the grounds that such act, directive, decision or
regulation is unlawful or an infringement of the provisions of this Treaty: Pro-
vided that where the matter for determination relates to any act, regulation,
directive or decision by a Member State, such person shall not refer the matter
for determination under this Article unless he has first exhausted local reme-
dies in the national courts or tribunals of the Member State.
Id.; see SADC Protocol on Tribunal and Rules of Procedure Thereof art. 15(1), Aug. 7,
2000, http://www.sadc.int (last visited Nov. 27, 2006); EAC Treaty, supra note 26, art.
30.
224. See Jackson, supra note 48, at 322.
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performs the constitutional function of limiting the power of
governments to decide which community laws are worth enforc-
ing, thus guaranteeing greater governmental compliance with
community law.2 25 Individuals will also be able to participate in
the creation of community law through strategic litigation and
legal submissions that will shape the jurisprudence of courts.2 2 6
All these will ensure greater compliance with community law.
The reliance on decisions of international tribunals by na-
tional courts will also strengthen the former by broadening the
reach of their jurisprudence. The stature of a court partly de-
pends on the recognition accorded its jurisprudence by other
courts both within and outside of its jurisdiction.227 In this re-
gard, it is hoped that national courts in Africa will begin to make
use, where appropriate, of the jurisprudence of African interna-
tional tribunals in adjudication. This can be facilitated by regu-
lar interaction between international tribunals in Africa and
their national counterparts, and the making of their jurispru-
dence readily available. The selection of international judges
from the national courts may be an important first step in forg-
ing this relationship. 228
225. See id.
226. See id. at 326.
227. See Thomas Buergenthal, Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Is It
Good or Bad?, 14 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 267, 269, 271-72 (stating that the effect ofjudicial,
quasijudicial, and arbitral institutions on individual States is to socialize them to the
idea of international adjudication and proposing that the fact that leading international
law practitioners and judges serve on administrative tribunals contributes to the cross-
fertilization of international jurisprudence and thus to the enrichment of international
law in general). Cf Joseph R. Wetzel, Improving Fundamental Rights Protection in the Euro-
pean Union, 71 FORDHA L. REV. 2823, 2832-33 (2003) (noting that the European
Court ofJustice's capability as a fundamental rights guardian hinges on how much the
Court's decisions actually affect the European Commission Member States and deter-
mining that national courts within the Member States must consistently comply with,
accept, and apply the Court's decisions for them to have any real influence within the
European Union).
228. See generally Maria Alejandra Rodriguez Lemmo, Study of Selected International
Dispute Resolution Regimes, With an Analysis of the Decisions of the Court of Justice of the An-
dean Community, 19 ARiz.J. INT'L & COmP. L. 863, 893-95 (2002) (discussing the compo-
sition of the European Court of Justice, noting that the judges come from the Member
States); Wetzel, supra note 227, at 2834 (opining that the European Court of Justice
must derive legitimacy from the support of the Member States and their populations,
even in the face of disagreement with the decisions, and contending that without com-
pliance and legitimacy, the Court's decisions provide lip service, but no real protection
to individuals).
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C. Reform of National Legal Rules
The interaction between international and national law also
holds the potential for inspiring reform of aspects of national
law.229 This is especially so in the area of human rights law, but
it also remains true for others areas of law. An awareness of, and
a reliance on, international human rights law has led to reforms
in many aspects of African customary law. 230 The patriarchal
and communal tendencies of customary law are coming under
attack from the egalitarian and individualist teachings of human
rights. 231 But the impact of international law is being, and in-
deed must be, felt in other areas of law as well. 23 2
The Ugandan case of Shah v Manurama Ltd.2 3 provides an
example of how international law commitments may affect do-
mestic civil procedure rules. In this case, the defendant brought
an application seeking an order requiring the plaintiff to pay
security for costs. 234 The plaintiff was resident in Kenya, and
thus outside the jurisdiction of the Uganda High Court. The
defendant argued that the fact that the plaintiff was resident
abroad was prima facie ground for ordering payment of costs.
229. See Buergenthal, supra note 227, at 271 (noting that international law influ-
ences the content of international conventions, domestic legislation, and national juris-
prudence applicable to international transactions and international relations).
230. See, e.g., Innocent Anaba, African Human Rights Court Judges Sworn In, VAN-
GUARD, July 17, 2006, http://www.vanguardngr.com/articles/2002/world/w317072006.
html (last visited Nov. 27, 2006) (reporting that "[t]oday signposts a new beginning in
the battle to enthrone a culture of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
on the continent and we shall support the judges to ensure they keep the promise
which this day represents in the life of all Africans"); African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights, http://www.aict-ctia.org/courts-conti/achpr/achprhome.html (last
visited Nov. 1, 2006) (stating that before the adoption of the African Court on Human
and Peoples' Rights Protocol ("ACHPRP"), the protection of rights listed in the African
Charter rested solely with the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, a
quasi-judicial body, modeled on the U.N. Human Rights Committee).
231. See, e.g., Act 29 of 1960, Criminal Code § 314A, (1960) (Ghana) (outlawing
the customary practice of Trokosi, i.e. sending young girls to a priest to atone for the
sins of a family member by performing sexual acts); Ephrahim v. Pastory, 87 I.L.R. 106,
110, 119 (Tanz. High Ct. 1992) (where reliance on human rights law influenced the
abrogation of a customary rule barring women from selling land, namely clan land).
232. See infra notes 233-250 and accompanying text. See generally Daphne Barak-
Erez, Israel: The Security Barrier-Between International Law, Constitutional Law, and Domes-
tic Judicial Review, 4 INT'LJ. CONsT. L. 540, 552 (2006) (discussing the growing impor-
tance of international law in domestic adjudication, and using the law of security barri-
ers in Israel as an example).
233. 2003 1 E. Afr. L. Rep. 294 (Uganda).
234. Id. at 296.
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In so arguing, the defendant relied on well-established common
law principles.235 In reply, the plaintiff argued that given the re-
establishment of the EAC, the question of residence for the pur-
pose of ordering security for costs should be re-examined.236 In
denying the application, the Court held that in East Africa,
"there could no longer be an automatic and inflexible presump-
tion for the courts to order payment of security for costs with
regard to a plaintiff who is resident in the East African Commu-
nity.12 7 The Court reasoned that the fact of East African Com-
munity residence "begs for a fresh re-evaluation of our judicial
thinking" as regards the implementation of the law requiring
plaintiffs to pay security for costs. 23 8 Among the factors that in-
fluenced the court in declining the application were the facts
that:
(2) All the three countries of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania
are partner States in the East African Community ("EAC").
(3) The East African Community Treaty (like the European
Community Treaty) seeks to establish a customs union, a
common market, and a monetary union-as integral pillars
of the community; and ultimately, a political union among
the partner States. In particular, the East African Community
Treaty makes express provision for the unification and
harmonisation of the laws of the partner States, including
"standardisation of the judgments of courts within the Com-
munity" (article 216); and establishment of a common bar
(that is cross-border legal practice) in the partner States ....
(4) The underlying objective of undertaking all the initiatives
described above-and many more not discussed in this rul-
ing-are stated in article 5 of the East African Community
Treaty as being the need: "to develop policies and program-
mes aimed at widening and deepening cooperation among the
partner states in political, economic, social and cultural
fields, research and technology, defence, security and legal
and judicial affairs, for their mutual benefit." (emphasis ad-
ded)
(7) Article 104 of the East African Community Treaty pro-
vides for the free movement of persons, labour, services, and
235. Id.
236. Id. at 299.
237. Id. at 298.
238. Id. at 297.
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the right of establishment and residence. The partner States
are under obligation to ensure the enjoyment of these rights
by their citizens within the community. In this regard, the
court is mindful of the fact that the East African Community
Treaty has the force of law in each partner State (article
8(2) (b)); and that this treaty law has precedence over na-
tional law (article 8(5)).239
This case demonstrates a clear appreciation on the part of the
Court of the importance of Community law and its impact on
existing national laws. It is refreshing that individuals are begin-
ning to enforce the benefits Community law provides for them.
This can be enhanced by promoting in individuals, lawyers, and
judges an awareness of the existence, implications and benefits
of Community law. This is a task that should be pursued vigor-
ously by the various economic communities in Africa. Hope-
fully, the engagement between community law, national courts
and individuals will continue.
International law can also provide a basis for the develop-
ment of the common law through legislation and judicial deci-
sions.2 4 ° In this regard, it is significant that the South Africa
Constitution requires courts to develop the common law or cus-
239. Id. at 297-98. This section of the decision refers to the EAC Treaty. Article 1
of the EAC treaty states that "'Partner States' means the Republic of Kenya, the Repub-
lic of Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania and any other country granted
membership to the Community under Article 3 of this Treaty." The Preamble outlines
the goals of the EAC Treaty, including the establishment of a customs union, a com-
mon market, and a monetary union. Article 126 encourages the "standardisation of the
judgements of courts within the Community." Article 5 outlines the objectives of the
Community. Article 104 discusses the free movement of persons and labour. Article 8
describes the responsibilities of the Partner States in undertaking implementation.
240. See, e.g., Dietrich v. The Queen (1992) 177 C.L.R. 292 (Austl.). In Dietrich, the
Court had to consider whether the common law recognized the right of an accused to
legal representation in a criminal trial. The accused relied on Section 14(3) of the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and argued for the development of
the common law to recognize this right. The Court accepted that where the common
law is uncertain, the court may develop it by looking to international law. See also
Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) (S. Afr.). In Carmichele,
the applicant argued for the development of the common law to recognize that a legal
duty was placed on the police and prosecution to protect her from assault. In arguing
for the imposition of this duty, the applicant relied on the constitutional right to life,
the right to respect for and protection of dignity, the right to freedom and security, the
right to privacy, and the right to freedom of movement. The Constitutional Court de-
clined to develop the common law in this instance on the ground that it had not had
the benefit of the fully considered opinion of the lower courts on the alternative
courses to follow in such development. See Carmichele, (4) SA at 941.
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tomary law so as to promote the spirit, purport, and objects of
the Bill of Rights. 2 4  When interpreting the Bill of Rights, the
Court must make use of international law. It is suggested that,
through this route, international law may be used to develop the
common law.24 2 Where the common law is unclear or non-exis-
tent on an issue, international law could be used to clarify or
develop it. As Justice Brennan has noted, "the common law does
not necessarily conform with international law, but international
law is a legitimate and important influence on the development
of the common law, especially when international law declares
the existence of universal human rights."
243
It is not only international human rights that can be rele-
vant for the development of the common law in Africa. Interna-
tional commercial law, as reflected in, for example, the work of
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
("UNCITRAL") and the International Institute for the Unifica-
tion of Private Law ("UNIDROIT") 244 could provide rules for the
development of commercial law. For example, payment systems,
insolvency, and electronic commerce are areas in which the
work of UNIDROIT may greatly benefit common law.245 This is
especially so in light of the highly underdeveloped state of these
areas of the law in Africa. In recent times, a proposed Uniform
241. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 art. 39(2); see Carmichele, (4) SA at 941.
242. See, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Constitutionalization of Children's
Rights: Incorporating Emerging Human Rights into Constitutional Doctrine, 2 U. PA.J. CONST.
L. 1, 42-44 (1999) (discussing the importance of developing common law through pro-
visions of the South African Constitution that encourage the consideration of interna-
tional law).
243. Mabo v. Queensland 11 (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 68.
244. There are currently only four African members of UNIDROIT: Egypt, Nige-
ria, South Africa, and Tunisia. See International Institute for the Unification of Private Law,
Membership, http://www.unidroit.org/english/members/main.htm (last visited Nov. 5,
2006).
245. See generally Statute of the International Institute for the Unification of Private
Law art. 1, Mar. 26, 1993, 15 U.S.T. 2504 (declaring the goals of International Institute
for the Unification of Private Law ("UNIDROIT") to be the "harmonizing and coordi-
nating [of] the private law of States and groups of States, and to prepare gradually for
the adoption by the various States of uniform rules of private law"). For an explanation
of the position taken by the United Nations on payment systems, insolvency, and elec-
tronic commerce, see United Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in
International Trade, G.A. Res. 56/81, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/81 (Jan. 31, 2002); Legisla-
tive Guide on Insolvency Law of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law, G.A. Res. 59/40, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/40 (Dec. 16, 2004); United Nations
Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts, G.A.
Res. 60/21, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/21 (Dec. 9, 2005).
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Act of OHADA on contracts is being influenced by UNIDROIT
principles of International Commercial Contracts.2 4 6 This devel-
opment is refreshing in light of the relatively underdeveloped
state of the law in this area in Africa. The work of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law2 4 7 can also shape the
development of the common law rules on private international
law;2 4 8 a subject whose development has been utterly neglected
in Africa. Indeed, so underdeveloped is the subject in Africa
that one writer has described it as "the Cinderella subject seldom
studied [and] little understood. '249 The Hague Conventions on
private international law can provide the basis for legislation in
areas where the common law responses have proved inadequate,
ineffective, or unduly complicated, such as in the areas of securi-
ties and child abduction.2 5 °
The extent to which the works of these international law
institutions can provide the basis for the development of na-
tional law is a function of the degree of States' participation in
their activities. Thus, the author suggests that there is need for
increased participation of African countries in the works of these
forums. It is only by their participation that the specific needs
and legal traditions of a country can be taken into account as
these institutions develop their law. 2 51 Participation also creates
a potentially supportive domestic constituency, thus making for
246. See, e.g., Date-Bah, supra note 90, at 269-72 (2004); see also Marcel Fontaine,
Abstract, 9 UNIFORM L. REV. 266, 266-67 (2004).
247. The author examines the relationship between the Hague Conference and
Africa in greater detail elsewhere. See Richard F. Oppong, The Hague Conference and the
Development of Private International Law in Africa: A Plea for Cooperation, 8 Y.B. PRIVATE
INT'L L. (forthcoming 2007). There are currently only three African members of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law: Egypt, Morocco, and South Africa.
See generally Hague Conference on Private International Law, Member States, http://www.
hcch.net (last visited Nov. 5, 2006).
248. SeeJohn David McClean, The Contribution of the Hague Conference to the Develop-
ment of Private International Law in Common Law Countries, 233 RECUIEL DES COURS (Issue
2) 275 (1992); see also PETER NORTH, Hague Conventions and the Reform of English Conflict
of Laws, in ESSAYS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL Law 225, 225-56 (1993).
249. C. F. FORSYTH, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw: THE MODERN ROMAN-DUTCH
LAw INCLUDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE HIGH COURTS 43 (4th ed., 2003).
250. See, e.g., Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of
Securities Held with an Intermediary, July 5, 2006, http://www.hcch.net (last visited
Nov. 27, 2006); Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduc-
tion, Oct. 25, 1980, http://patriot.net/-crouch/haguetext.html (last visited Nov. 27,
2006).
251. See generally Maluwa, International Law-Making, supra note 3 (discussing the
role of the OAU in contributing to the development and expansion of international
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increased awareness and easier implementation of laws devel-
oped in these forums. 25 2 In an era of increased interdepen-
dency and legal interaction, Africa cannot afford to be oblivious
to or isolated from developments in these international forums.
Africa's devotion to human rights law, as reflected in the incor-
poration of human rights provisions into national constitutions
and the proliferation of human rights NGOs on the continent
should be matched with similar attention to these equally impor-
tant developments in other aspects of international law.25 3
D. Democratic Deficit
This examination suggests that the elected branches of gov-
ernment, the executive and legislature, appear to have surren-
dered part of State sovereignty to international institutions.254
Additionally, the unelected branch of government, that is, the
judiciary, has been asserting a level of autonomy as regards inter-
preting the role of international law in the national legal sys-
tem. 255 Furthermore, issues of representation and accountability
appear not to have been wholly accounted for in these new ar-
rangements for receiving international law. These issues raise
questions of a potential democratic deficit at two levels.
At the international level, one may query the propriety of
entrusting "national law-making powers" to international institu-
tions that are not directly accountable to the people who are
often affected by the decisions. For example, treaty making
law); Maluwa, The OA U/African Union and International Law, supra note 3 (outlining re-
cent international law making among African States).
252. See generally Maluwa, International Law-Making, supra note 3; Maluwa, The
OAU/African Union and International Law, supra note 3.
253. See, e.g., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MADAGASCAR 1992, pmbl., art.
40(2); THE CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF MOROCCO 1992, pmbl (stating "[a]ware
of the need of incorporating its work within the frame of the international organisa-
tions of which it has become an active and dynamic members, the Kingdom of Morocco
fully adheres to the principles, rights and obligations arising from the charters of such
organisations, as it reaffirms its determination to abide by the universally recognised
human rights"); S. AnR. CONST. 1996, pmbl. (stating that South Africa "adopt[s] this
Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic so as to [h] eal the divisions of the past
and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental
human rights"). For a list of African NGOs that perform human rights work in Africa,
see African NGO's, http://billie.lib.duke.edu/pubdocs/ngo/africa.asp (last visited
Nov. 10, 2006).
254. See supra notes 29, 31, 42, 61, 72, 92, 93, 204, 207 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 121, 130, 142 and accompanying text.
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often takes place behind closed doors with little outside input.
25 6
As Terrence Daintith put it, "international law is formed in an
inherently non-democratic way.., by conclaves of treaty negotia-
tors collectively responsible to no representative body. ' 2 57 This
non-democratic issue is exacerbated where the treaty regime
creates supranational organizations like the EAC, AEC, and
OHADA. Such supranational organizations have powers to take
decisions that are directly or automatically applicable within the
national legal system, 25" and their treaty regimes often preclude
governments from taking certain decisions domestically on the
pain of being in breach of their international commitments.
259
Admittedly, a more open, representative, and participatory
process of international lawmaking may mitigate these con-
cerns. 2 60 The problem, however, is always who gets represented
and by whom. Various interests groups such as women, inves-
256. See, e.g., PARLIAMENTARY PARTICIPATION IN THE MAKING AND OPERATION OF
TREATIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY xi (Stefan A. Risenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, eds.,
1994) (explaining that treaty making powers have historically been held principally by
the national executive and secondarily by the parliament because of political relations
and national security).
257. Terence Daintith, Is International Law the Enemy of National Democracy?, in AmB-
Guly IN THE RULE OF LAW: THE INTERFACE BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LE-
GAL SYSTEMS, 115 (Thomas A.J.A Vandamme &Jan-Herman Reestman eds., 2001). Cus-
tomary international law evolves through State practice grounded in a sense of legal
obligation, a process which leaves even less scope for democratic argument.
258. See AEC Treaty, supra note 92, art. 8(3) (h); EAC Treaty, supra note 26, art.
78(2) (giving examples of such powers).
259. See EAC Treaty, supra note 26, arts. 3(e), 8(4), 8(5).
260. Some economic communities in Africa have appreciated this fact and have
made provision for community parliaments with elected representatives. See, for exam-
ple, Article 49(1) of the EAC Treaty, which makes the East African Legislative Assembly
established under Article 9(1) (f) of the Treaty the legislative organ of the community.
EAC Treaty, supra note 26, arts. 49(1), 9(1) (f). This Assembly consist of, among others,
twenty-seven members elected from the various national assemblies of the member
states. Id., arts. 48(1) (a), 49(2) (a). The Community Assembly is to liaise with the na-
tional assemblies of the Member States on matters relating to the Community. Article
7(c) of the AEC Treaty also establishes a Pan-African Parliament with a view to ensuring
that the people of Africa are fully involved in the economic development and integra-
tion of the continent. SeeAEC Treaty, supra note 92, art. 7(c). Full details on this Parlia-
ment are contained in the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic
Community Relating to the Pan-African Parliament 2001, March 2, 2001, http://
www.africanreview.org/docs/civsoc/pap.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2006) [hereinafter
Protocol]. It is envisaged that the Pan-African Parliament will ultimately evolve into an
institution with full legislative powers with members elected by universal adult suffrage.
Protocol, art. 2(3). Article 6(1) (c) of the Treaty of the Economic Community of West
African States also establishes a Community Parliament. Treaty of the Economic Com-
munity of West African States, art. 6(1) (c), July 24, 1993, 35 I.L.M. 660 (1996).
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tors, and traders are all significantly affected by international
law.2 61  Ensuring a voice for them in the creation of interna-
tional law represents a formidable challenge. The fact that these
interests are often not represented, coupled with the increasing
application of international law in the national legal system, sug-
gests that legislatures in Africa must strengthen their oversight
responsibility as far as international law is concerned.2 6 2 Mecha-
nisms such as question times in parliament and the use of the
parliamentary committee system should be put in place to en-
sure legislative involvement in the processes leading to the con-
clusion of international agreements. 26 3 Establishing a specific
parliamentary committee responsible for examining develop-
ments in international law and their domestic significance or im-
pact will not be out of place. 264 The time when international law
was conceived as impacting only on relationships between sover-
eigns is history, hence, the need for greater attention to ensure
that its rules meet national needs and aspirations.265
While the democratic question is important, it can be criti-
cized for concentrating on the sources of norms and ignoring
their content.266 International laws may indeed, and often do,
reflect national values. Even when they do not, international law
261. See generally NOAH RUBINS & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, INTERNATIONAL INVEST-
MENT, POLITICAL RISK AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE xxiii (identify-
ing international law as playing an important role in governing investor protection,
treaties protecting foreign investment, and other matters of importance to investors);
Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, Feminist Approaches to Interna-
tional Law, 85 Am.J. INT'L L. 613 (1991) (discussing international law's distinct impact
on women).
262. See supra notes 121, 122, 130-133 and accompanying text.
263. For a comparative survey of the approach of various jurisdictions, see gener-
ally Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbot, Symposium on Parliamentary Participation
in the Making and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 293 (1991).
264. Seegenerally Opeskin, Constitutional ModellingPart II, supra note 167, at 102-04,
reprinted in 27 COMMW. L. BULL. 1270-71 (describing constitutional modeling and the
broad sharing of ideas on the relationship between international law and domestic law
as useful tools in adapting to developments in international law).
265. See id. at 102, reprinted in 27 COMMW. L. BULL. at 1247 (describing a State's
potential interest in regulating the relationship between international law and domestic
law because "their subject matter defines the effect of international norms on the do-
mestic legal system."); see also Samuel P. Baumgartner, Is Transnational Litigation Differ-
ent?, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1297, 1355 (2004); Christian N. Okeke, International
Law in the Nigerian Legal System, 27 CAL W. INT'L L. J. 311 (1997).
266. See generally John A. Perkins, The Changing Foundations of International Law:
From State Consent to State Responsibility, 15 B.U. INT'L L. J. 244 (1997) (criticizing such
concentration).
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can provide rules and a basis for the development of national
law. Indeed, history is replete with instances where people have
turned to international law "as a source of standards of fairness
and humanity to supplement local traditions which may be
tainted with bias, discrimination or faction. ' 26 7 South Africa pro-
vides an example of this.26" To merely dismiss a rule of law on
account of its source would be unfortunate. Substance should
overcome form in this regard. The presence of well laid out con-
ditions for allowing international law to have direct effect within
the national legal system, and an adjudication approach that
takes account of the national context and values when relying on
international law system, may further mitigate these concerns. 269
Courts may also develop rules that reduce, in appropriate cir-
cumstances, the direct application of international law. Exclu-
sionary rules on standing, the public/private character of the
treaty in question, and the directness and precision of the lan-
guage in which the treaty is couched can all be relevant consider-
ations in deciding on the direct application of international law
within the national legal system.27 °
Our conception of democracy should go beyond elections,
representation, or majoritarianism; ensuring the rule of law
should be paramount. In some instances the judiciary may have
to "take the lead" by using international law to protect people or
reform laws that have not yet engaged the attention of the legis-
lature. Reliance on international law brings other perspectives
to bear on decision making and could be seen as an exercise in
267. David Feldman, Monism, Dualism and Constitutional Legitimacy, 20 AUSTL. Y.B.
INT'L L. 105, 107 (1999). This is not to suggest that international law rules are necessa-
rily fair to all. Indeed, various groups, e.g. feminists, developing countries, or indige-
nous groups, often critique international law. See generally THE THIRD WORLD AND INTER-
NATIONAL ORDER: LAW, POLITICS, AND GLOBALISATION (Anthony Anghie et al. eds.,
2003).
268. See Feldman, supra note 267, at 116-20.
269. See id. at 119-20; Karen Knop, Here and There: International Law in Domestic
Courts, 32 N.Y.U.J. INT'L. L & POL. 501 (2000). The fact that domestic interpretation of
international law is often influenced by domestic values and considerations has been
criticized as often leading to outcomes that are not consistent with the position of inter-
national law. One writer has argued for the possibility of allowing for the "full and
open participation of all interested and affected players of the international community
in the adjudication process in municipal courts" in any domestic litigation where a
question of international law is in issue to ensure that the international law issues in-
volved are fully articulated. SeeJulian Hermida, A New Model ofApplication of International
Law in National Courts: A Transjudicial Vision, 11 WAIKATO L. REV. 37, 55 (2003).
270. See Jackson, supra note 48, at 327-28.
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comparative law; an exercise that courts, especially in common
law countries, routinely engage in by borrowing from the juris-
prudence of other national courts.27 ' It is dangerous, however,
to think that the use of all international law is an exercise in
comparative law and hence only persuasive authority. 272 Inter-
national norms that bind a country at the international level and
have been implemented at the national level cannot be treated
merely as persuasive.
At the national level, in the absence of a constitutional or
legislative mandate, we may query the authority ofjudges to rely
on international norms, such as international judicial decisions
in the creation of which the relevant country had no role to play,
and unincorporated treaties. 2 7 ' The increasing use of interna-
tional law by the judiciary threatens to disturb the balance of
power between the executive and the legislature as regards law-
making. While these concerns are legitimate, it should be borne
in mind that decisions of international tribunals are relatively
few and only serve as persuasive authority. Unfortunately, the
African decisions noted above did not clearly articulate the basis
upon which they used unincorporated treaties. 274 Nevertheless,
the idea that a government could assume an obligation at the
international level but remain free to breach it at the national
level seems legally unattractive, and morally reprehensible; it
paints a picture of an irresponsible government. By relying on
unincorporated treaties, the judiciary brings the government
onto the path of responsibility.
Elsewhere, courts have been trying to articulate the basis of
relying on unincorporated treaties. In the New Zealand case of
Tavita v. Minister of Immigration,275 a submission was made that,
because the Convention on the Rights of the Child had not been
incorporated into New Zealand law, it had no effect in the na-
tional legal system. To Cooke P, this argument was "unattrac-
tive" since it implied that "New Zealand's adherence to the inter-
national instruments has been at least partly window-dress-
271. See Monks, supra note 148, at 222-23.
272. Jutta Brunnee & StephenJ. Toope, A Hesitant Embrace: The Application of Inter-
national Law by Canadian Courts, 40 CAN. Y.B. INT'L. L. 3, 56 (2002).
273. See generally Kochan, supra note 148, at 538-51.
274. See supra notes 109-118, 123 and accompanying text.
275. [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. 257 (CA).
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ing.''276 This Article suggests that, as an organ of government,
the judiciary in Africa has a role in ensuring that governments
fulfill their international obligations and respect international
law. This is especially so where the obligations assumed or laws
engaged are meant to protect the individual from domestic
abuse, or foster and regulate commercial and other interactions
among individuals transacting on the international plane.
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A NEWJURISPRUDENCE
AND SCHOLARSHIP
The increasing use and relevance of international law in na-
tional legal systems in Africa reveal a great deal about how open
these countries are becoming to the influences of international
law. Lawyers, judges, litigants, and policy-makers all need to be
aware of how international law may impact on their choices.
This makes it imperative for all countries to have mechanisms
that ensure access to international law conventions, instruments,
and academic works. The role of international law in the na-
tional legal system is largely a function of the extent to which
counsel, judges, and academics are familiar with it. Interna-
tional law can no longer be consigned to a subsidiary discipline
in law faculties. International law should, however, not be con-
ceived as limited to international human rights law. While it ap-
pears that African academics, judges, legislators, and politicians
have recognized the importance of international law, a signifi-
cant amount of the international law discourse and jurispru-
dence in Africa has focused on international human rights law.
Although this devotion to human rights law is to be encouraged,
Africans appear to have neglected other equally significant areas
of international law. Unless they broaden their focus, they risk
losing the reformative and developmental benefits that can
come from similar recognition of other areas such as interna-
tional commercial law, international financial law, and private
international law. It is only when engagement with "the interna-
276. Id. at 266; see also Patrick D. Curran, Universalism, Relativism, and Private En-
forcement of Customary International Law, 5 CHI. J. INr'L L. 311 (2004) (discussing the
need for courts to take note of executive acts and statements in their attempt to allow
private enforcement of international legal norms which might not have become part of
domestic law).
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tional" begins to recognize the unexplored potentials in these
areas of law that Africans can secure the full benefits of interna-
tional law for individuals in, and for the development of, Africa.
